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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON BURT AFFLECK and 
JOSEPHINE F. AFFLECK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, Respondents 
and Cross Appellants, 
vs. 
GRANT MORGAN and EVA 
MORGAN, his wife, 
Defendants, Third Party 
Plaintiffs, Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents, 
vs. 
DAVID BURT AFFLECK and 
ISABELLA D. AFFLECK, his wife, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9350 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-
APPELLANTS, AND OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS 
AND RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" set forth in the Brief 
of Appellants and Cross-Respondents Morgan is chiefly a 
misstatement of the facts. Appellants contradict substantially 
all of the admissions of defendant Grant Morgan and of his 
witnesses A. Z. Richards and George B. Gudgell III. Appellants 
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even dispute the United States survey record and attempt to 
move the section line southward to a place where it never 
existed. Grant Morgan attempts to vary, extend and enlarge 
by argument and by parol his deed descriptions to cover plain-
tiffs' land, although the Morgans never purchased said land 
nor acquired any title to any part thereof, nor any easement 
across the same. Since appellants have not stated th~ material 
facts, it becomes necessary for respondents to do so. The 
details are set forth in the argument. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs and respondents Gordon Burt Affleck and 
Josephine F. Affleck, his wife, as record owners brought suit 
in ejectment to recover possession and damages from defendants 
and appellants Grant Morgan and Eva Morgan. The property 
' is in Mountair Canyon in Section 22, T. 1 S., R. 2 E., SLM. 
1 t is bounded on the north by the north line of Section 22 
and on the south by the north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merry-
wood, an unrecorded plat. (R. 1) . The Morgans by answer 
and counterclaim falsely alleged that they purchased the 
property in 1951 from David Burt Affleck (brother of Gordon 
Burt Affleck) , and claimed title by adverse possession. De-
fendants also sued for $12,000 "damages" for "loss" of the 
property if title is adjudged to be in plaintiffs, and also for 
"easements" over the property. (R. 6-11). By third-party 
complaint the Morgans sued David Burt Affleck and wife to 
recover $12,100 for "breach of warranty," alleging that the 
property described in the complaint was sold and conveyed 
to Grant Morgan by two warranty deeds dated June 2, 1951, 
and February 9, 1952, respectively. (R. 34-42). The two deeds 
(Exhibits 14-D and 15-D describe lands in Section 15, but 
do not cover any land described in the complaint nor any other 
land in Section 22. 
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Defendants have no record title to any of the land de-
scribed in the complaint. Defendants offered evidence of tax 
receipts, but they do not describe any portion of the lands 
conveyed to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have a clear record title 
to the land described in the complaint. The abstract of title 
(Exhibit 1-P) shows United States patent to Alvaro A. Pratt 
dated December 19, 1907, covering Lots 2, 3 and 4 of Section 
22, T. 1 S., R. 2 E., SLM. Said land became identified as Tract 
38 of the 1927 Government Resurvey, (Exhibit 6-P). Exhibit 
2-P is a bargain and sale deed to plaintiffs dated September 3, 
1955. Exhibit 3-P is a correction deed dated Juy 6, 1957, 
which covers the land described in the complaint, subject to 
a pipeline easement in favor of Lillian B. Affleck and subject 
to Restrictive Covenants. Exhibit 4-P is a plat of the various 
deed descriptions as platted by Jean R. Driggs, Sr., professional 
engineer and land surveyor. Said plat shows that there is no 
conflict whatsoever between any land descriptions in the deeds 
received by Grant Morgan and the land described in the com-
plaint. 
The two deeds to Grant Morgan from David Burt Affleck 
and wife, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D, do not cover any land in 
Section 22, but land in Section 15. The descriptions are tied 
to the northwest cornerof Section 15, and constitute part of 
the Old Arm Chair survey of 1901, which was based on the 
Ferron survey of Section 15 in 1891. The original section 
line between Sections 15 and 22 was established in 1891 by 
Augustus D. Ferron, approved March 23, 1894. The survey 
plat is Exhibit 7-P. A portion of the field-notes in the United 
States Survey Office constitute Exhibit 32-P. Ferron marked 
a stationary boulder or ledge 4 feet high for the corner common 
to Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. That monument was found 
in a good state of preservation during the Government Resurvey 
of Sections 22 and 23 in 1927, Exhibit 34-P. 
Section 22 was surveyed in 1902 by A. P. Hanson, survey 
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plat approved 1903, Exhibit 21-D (Exhibit 31-P is an enlarge-
ment of that plat). Instead of following the original Ferron 
north line of Section 22 established in 1891, Hanson established 
a "resurvey line" on the excuse that he could not find the 
Ferron corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. On pages 5 and 
6 of the brief of the appellants a number of serious misstate-
ments are made with respect to the surveys of Sections 15 and 
22. On page 6 appellants falsely assert that "The original 
North Quarter corner of Section 22, as established by Hanson, 
is 33 feet North of the North line of the Merrywood Sub-
division," and also that "The resurveyed North Quarter corner 
established by Miller is 22 feet further North of the original 
line established by the Hanson quarter comer. (Ex. D-18) ." 
Exhibit 35-P is a plat showing the position of the section 
lines of the Ferron survey of 1891, the Hanson survey of 
Section 22 in 1902, and the Government Resurvey of Section 
22 in 1927. Said plat was prepared by Jean R. Driggs, Sr., 
after he made a comprehensive survey of Section 22 including 
the property in dispute, Exhibits 37-P and 38-P. It is significant 
that A. Z. Richards and George B. Gudgell III, engineers 
who testified for the Morgans, did not question the accuracy 
of the Driggs survey nor his plattings. To assure the accuracy 
of his surveys Driggs made Polaris observations at 5 separate 
points or stations in Section 22. 
There is a plat in th back of this brief which is a copy 
of Exhibit 3 5-P with other information from the field-notes 
and computations shown in red ink. The Hanson north line 
of Section 22 was not the original line as represented by appel-
lants, but a "resurvey line" according to Hanson's own field 
notes, Exhibit 33-P. Contrary to the assertions of appellants 
said Hanson north line of Section 22 was not south, but north 
of the section line as reestablished on the Government Resurvey 
of 1927. Instead of being 22 feet south of the present section 
line, the Hanson north quarter corner of Section 22 was shown 
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by the Hanson field notes and the measurements to the known 
Hanson corners of the 1927 Government Resurvey, to be 561 
feet north and about 2800 feet east of the original Ferron 
corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. Appellants and their 
witnesses repeatedly referred to a fictitious monument which 
was destroyed in 1927 by the government surveyors as the 
"old original corner" and as the "Hanson corner" and as the 
"Hanson south quarter corner of Section 15." Hanson never 
claimed that he set the south quarter corner of Section 15. 
His north quarter corner of Section 22 was set (if set at all) 
on his resurvey line. That monument was of different dimen-
sions and marked on the opposite face and about 560 feet 
northerly from the rock which was destroyed in 1927. Mr. 
Gudgell admitted that he did not know who set the rock 
monument which was destroyed, and that it did not fit the 
description of the corner which Hanson set in 1902. (R. 248-
270). 
In 1957 Grant Morgan had a survey (Exhibits 30-P and 
64-P) by Mr. Gudgel!. Said survey was based on the deed 
descriptions. Mr. Gudgell stated that he found no conflict 
between the deed descriptions to Grant Morgan and the lands 
described in the complaint. The deed to Grant Morgan cover-
ing Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, (Exhibit 16-D) is on the south 
side of the land described in the complaint, and the lands 
deeded to Grant Morgan (Exhibits 14-D and 15-D) are on 
the north. (R. 240, 244-247, 293-294). In 1957 Mr. Gudgell 
made no note of any fences. He made another survey in 1959 
which was a fence line survey following certain sections of 
fence. (Exhibits 17-P and 18-P). His 1959 survey did not 
follow the deed descriptions. He did not tie his survey to any 
monument specified in the deeds, but to a nonexistent monu-
ment. His plat shows a land description to be 3 7 feet farther 
south than the deed descriptions of Exhibit 14-D and 15-D. 
(R. 304-305). At least part of the fence was put up after suit 
was commenced. (R. 680-682) . 
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Defendants introduced in evidence a survey of H. G. Hall 
made in 1931 which was supposed to be based upon the de-
scriptions in deeds to the predecessors of David Burt Affleck. 
(Exhibit 40-D). A. Z. Richards, partner of H. G. Hall, admitted 
that the survey started ''at a stake 1 ying on the ground'' and 
did not follow the deed descriptions, but was a projection 
of some noncontinuous posts, and that such description was 
58 feet farther to the south than whar is called for in the 
deeds themselves. (R. 434-435, 441-445, 439, 457, 462, 469-
473, 475-478). 
Grant Morgan had his own real estate broker make the 
purchase from David Burt Affleck. Affleck asked $7,500, 
but Morgan paid only $4,500. Affleck made no representations 
as to boundaries nor what he owned. A year previously Morgan 
negotiated to purchase from plaintiffs' predecessors the south 
161;2 feet of the land described in the complaint, and he knew 
that David Burt Affleck wanted to acquire a tract of land on 
the north of that 161;2 foot strip. (R. 580-587, 661-664). 
Grant Morgan admitted that he paid no attention to bound-
aries, and that he did not know just where they are. His alleged 
improvements were only partially on the land described in 
the complaint, made from and after 1954, after he had notice 
of his lack of title. His activities were partially concealed by 
brush, trees, etc. Grant Morgan took possession of the land 
described in the complaint, but he did not pay any taxes 
assessed against the land. 
POINTS ON WHICH RESPONDENTS RELY ON THIS 
APPEAL INCLUDING CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Gordon Burt Affleck and wife have a valid record title 
to all lands described in the complaint, and were entitled 
to decree adjudicating their ownership. The appellants Morgan 
never acquired any title to any portion of the land by deed, 
by adverse possession, nor otherwise. 
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2. Contrary to the arguments of appellants, the court did 
not quiet title in Gordon Burt Affleck and wife to any land north 
of the "Hanson south quarter corner of Section 15." 
3. Appellants have no capacity to impeach the 1927 Gov-
ernment Resurvey of Section 22. There is no merit to the 
argument that "The court erred in basing title upon the re-
survey." 
4. The contention that "The decision of the court is in-
equitable in refusing to recognize reasonable enjoyment of 
the land surrounding the Burt Affleck home,'' disregards both 
the facts and the law. 
5. There is no merit to the argument that "The court 
erred in not allowing appellants the opportunity of claiming 
recovery for improvements to the land." 
6. Contrary to argument of appellants, the trial court 
permitted the Morgans to present any competent evidence they 
could produce as to alleged easements, as well as any proffers 
of proof defendants desired to make. 
7. The court pproperly dismissed appellants' third party 
complaint against David Burt Affleck and wife. The appeal 
is obviously designed for delay to harass said respondents and 
this court should assess daamges against the Morgans for 
prolonging the groundless litigation against third-party de-
fendants. 
8. The evidence does not warrant the granting of any 
easement to Grant Morgan and Eva Morgan; and the portions 
of the judgment and decree quoted in the cross-appeal should 
be stricken from the judgment and decree. The absence of 
David Burt Affleck from the State of Utah for a period of 
four years constituted a break in the prescriptive period, al-
though fiis absence was due to military service. 
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POINT I 
GORDON BURT AFFLECK AND WIFE HAVE A 
VALID RECORD TITLE TO ALL LANDS DESCRIBED IN 
THE COMPLAII\JT, AND WERE ENTITLED TO DECREE 
ADJUDICATING THEIR OWNERSHIP. THE APPEL-
LANTS MORGAN NEVER ACQUIRED ANY TITLE TO 
ANY PORTION OF THE LAND BY DEED, BY ADVERSE 
POSSESSION, NOR OTHERWISE. 
There is no merit to the argument of appellants Grant 
Morgan and wife that the plaintiffs and respondents Gordon 
Burt Affleck and Josephine F. Affleck, his wife, "failed to 
prove" a valid record title to the land described in the com-
plaint. By their admission, A. Z. Richards and George B. 
Gudgell III, engineers called to testify for the Morgans, helped 
to prove the record title of plaintiffs and to destroy all pretense 
of title asserted by defendant Grant Morgan. 
The land owned by plaintiffs and respondents Gordon 
Burt Affleck and wife is 48.7 feet in width on the easterly side 
of the Mountair Road in Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 
2 East, Salt Lake Meridian. The south line of the tract is the 
north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood. The north line of 
the tract is the nortli line of Section 22. Exhibit 1-P is the 
abstract of title which shows the patent to Alvaro A. Pratt 
dated December 19, 1907, covering Lots 2, 3 and 4 of Section 
22, a conveyance to Parker B. Pratt, and a decree of distribution 
in the estate of Parker B. Pratt to Paul E. and Maybeth Farr 
Reimann. Exhibit 2-P is a bargain and sale deed from the 
Reimanns to Gordon Burt Affleck and wife dated September 
3, 1955. It clearly conveys all land between Lots 1 and 2 of 
Merrywood and the north line of Section 22. Exhibit 3-P 
is a correction deed between the same parties dated July 6, 
1957. 
Exhibit 4-P is a plat of the deed descriptions, with the 
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deed description of plaintiffs' lands shown in yellow, the deed 
description of lands conveyed to Grant Morgan shaded in 
blue, and the description of land conveyed to the David A. 
Affleck Association, Inc., indicated in green. Said plat was 
prepared by Jean R. Driggs, Sr., professional engineer and 
land surveyor, from the deed descriptions after Mr. Driggs 
completed an extensive survey of lands in Section 22 in 1958 
and 1959, including the land in dispute. See Exhibits 37-P 
and 38-P. (R. 334-425). In order to insure the accuracy of his 
survey, Mr. Driggs made Polaris observations at five points 
in Section 22. (R. 337). Neither of the engineers called to 
testify for appellants questioned the accuracy of the Driggs 
survey nor the correctness of his plattings. Said plat demon-
strates that the descriptions in the deeds to Grant Morgan 
do not in any way conflict with the land described in the com-
plaint. 
Exhibit 13-D is an abstract of title coveri~g Lots 1 and 
2 of Merrywood, an unrecorded plat. Exhibit 16-D is a special 
Warranty deed dated October 22, 195 3, covering said land, 
from Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company to Grant Morgan. 
The metes and bounds descriptions are tied to Contrary Girl 
Rock. The north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood constitute 
the south boundary of the land described in the complaint. 
Grant Morgan so admitted at the trial. (R. 572-573). 
By answer the appellants made the unfounded claim that 
they had purchased the land described in the complaint from 
third-party defendants David Burt Affleck and his wife in 
1951. The two deeds which they received from David Burt 
Affleck, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D do not cover any portion of 
land described in the complaint. (Exhibit 30-P, R. 307). Ex-
hibit 14-D is a deed dated June 2, 1951, which covers a tract 
of land in Section 15 described as follows: 
Beginning at a point in the center of road, said point 
being South 83 o 25' East 150.53 feet from stake #31, 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
said stake #31 being described in instrument #678340, 
Book #74 page 513,a s being 79.16 chains South and 
28.91 chains East from the Northwest corner of Section 
15, Township One South, Range Two East, Salt Lake 
Meridian; thence running North 28° 44' 44" East 94.69 
feet; thence South 49° 45' East 130 feet, to the South 
line of said Section~ 15; thence West along said Section 
line} 75.93 feet, more or less, to stake #32 in the center 
of road; thence North 83 ° 25' West 54.07 feet, to the 
place of beginning. (Emphasis added). 
Except for the portion of the description "to the South 
line of said Section 15, thence West along said section line," 
the southerly line of the deed description would be approxi-
mately 20 feet north of the south line of Section 15. As shown 
by the platting of deed descriptions in Exhibit 4-P, it was 
necessary for Mr. Driggs to push stake #31 south about 20 
feet in order for the description to extend to the south line of 
Section 15 with a closure of the metes and bounds description. 
The fact is confirmed by the survey plat made by George B. 
Gudgell III for Grant Morgan in 1957, Exhibit 30-P and 64-P. 
(R. 293-294). Mr. Gudgell stated that the general rule in 
surveying is that when a deed description shows a course to 
be so many feet to a section line, the surveyor recognizes the 
section line as it then exists. (R. 293). When Mr. Gudgell 
made his survey in 1957 he was given the description of 
Exhibits 14-D and 15-D, the deeds from David Burt Affleck 
and wife to Grant Morgan, and also the deed to Lots 1 and 2 
of Merrywood, as the properties he should survey (R. 2 39-
240). Mr. Gudgell platted the area between the north line 
of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood and the north line of Section 
22 as about 55 feet in width. (R. 241). He found no conflict 
between the north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood and the 
south line of the land described in the complaint. (R. 246-
247). The deed to Grant Morgan covering Lots 1 and 2 of 
Merrywood, Exhibit 16-D does not conflict in its description 
with the land described in the complaint. (R. 247). Mr. 
10 
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Gudgell did not dispute the accuracy of the Driggs survey 
made in 1958 and 1959. In his 1957 survey Mr. Gudgell 
located the section line several feet farther north than shown 
by Mr. Driggs on Exhibit 4-P. (R. 292). 
Mr. Gudgell admitted that the west line of Section 15 
as surveyed in 1891 by A. D. Ferron was 80 chains or 1 mile 
in length, and that the south line of Section 15 as surveyed by 
Mr. Ferron was 80 chains. (R. 250). Mr. Gudgell recognized 
that the J. E. Evers survey of Old Arm Chair plat in Section 
15 in 1901 was based on the Ferron survey. (R. 255-256, 305). 
Mr. A. Z. Richards, professional engineer and land sur-
veyor, who was called to testify for the Morgans, likewise 
did not dispute the accuracy of the Driggs surveys. Mr. 
Richards recognized that "stake 31" and "stake 32" in the 
deed descriptions, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D, had reference to 
those points in the "Old Arm Chair Plat," Exhibit 5-P. Mr. 
Richards prepared Exhibit 42-D, which showed the position 
of those points. Stake # 31 would be 55.44 feet north of the 
south line of Section 15 if that section line ran due east and 
west. (R. 462). Mr. Richards said that the call in the deed 
of 79.16 chains south of the northwest corner of Section 15 
would be .84 of a chain or 55.44 feet north of the southwest 
corner of Section 15. (R. 469) . He said that the position 
of stake # 32 by actual measurement from the northwest corner 
of Section 15 would be north of, not on the south line of 
Section 15. (R. 457). On his Exhibit 42-D Mr. Richards pro-
jected a line due east from the original southwest corner of 
Section 15 as set by A. D. Ferron in 1891. Mr. Richards testi-
fied that the relocated South quarter corner of Section 15 is 
16.13 feet north of that projected line by reason of the fact 
that the section line as traced Jon the Government Resurvey 
in 1927 has a bearing of North 89° 39' East from the original 
southwest corner of Section 15. Mr. Richards admitted that 
in platting the deed descriptions on Exhibit 4-P, Mr. Driggs 
11 
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had to move stake # 31 south about 20 feet in order for the 
description in Exhibit 14-D to reach the south line of Section 
15. (R. 469, 477-478). 
The deed description of Exhibit 15-D does not extend south 
to the south line of Section 15. There is a strip of land between 
said tract and the land described in the complaint. Even Mr. 
Morgan admitted that there is a gap on the survey plat between 
the land described in the complaint and stake #31. (R. 576). 
Grant Morgan admitted on deposition that he did not know 
what lands are described in the complaint and that he did 
not know whether he ever got a deed to any part of that land. 
He knew he never got any deed from the Reimanns. (R. 588-
589). 
In 1948 Grant Morgan said he was advised by Dr. Ralph 
Pendleton that Paul E. Reimann had bought out the Parker 
B. Pratt estate. Mr. Morgan said Dr. Pendleton told him that 
the Reimanns had bought lands in Section 22. (R. 580). In 
1950 Grant Morgan stated he had negotiations with Dr. 
Pendleton to acquire a strip of land 16¥2 feet in width o~ 
the north side of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, and that he 
also had a conversation with Mr. Reimann about it. Mr. 
Morgan knew Dr. Pendleton wanted the Reimanns to deed 
16¥2 feet of land on the north side of Lots 1 and 2 of Merry-
wood to Mr. Morgan for some other ground. (R. 580-582). 
Mr. Morgan admitted on deposition that he talked to Mr. 
Reimann about such a proposed conveyance. Mr. Morgan said 
that Dr. Pendleton told him that Dr. Pendleton and the 
Reimanns owned that land. Mr. Morgan knew that the 
Reimanns had some interest in that land. (R. 585-587). 
Grant Morgan admitted that he did not know where the 
boundaries of that tract of land are situated on the ground. 
On deposition Mr. Morgan tesified that from 1950 to 1956 
he did not claim any title to any land which appeared on the 
records of Salt Lake County in the names of Paul E. Reimann 
12 
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and Maybeth Farr Reimann or either of them, but that as a 
result of the survey in 195 7 he claimed title to the land de· 
scribed in the complaint. (R. 591-593). 
One of the surprise moves in the case was the attempt 
of the Morgans to assert title "to a fence line." (R. 584). 
Neither the Gudgell survey of 1957 nor the Driggs survey of 
1958 and 1959 showed any fence line whatsoever. No claim 
of a fence line was made at the pretrial nor in the answer 
and counterclaim of the Morgans. Mr. Morgan was permitted 
to testify that a fence was erected in 1912 by the "Bell boys," 
who allegedly purchased Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood. The 
alleged location of the fence was entirely on the land dt 
scribed in the complaint which was then owned by Alvaro A. 
Pratt. There was no pretense of erection of a fence to settle 
a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners, nor of 
any cultivation to the fence, for the fence ran through marsh-
land and brush. It could not have been a boundary line between 
the predecessors of David Burt Affleck of land in Section 
15 and the grantees of Lots 1 and 2 as contended by appel-
lants, for the reason that the land of plaintiffs described in 
the complaint lies in between. The alleged fence was allegedly 
erected on land owed of record by plaintiffs whose predecessors 
had nothing to do with its erection. Under the doctrine of 
Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P. 2d 257, the alleged 
fence entirely on land of a third party could not be treated 
as a boundary between lands separated by land owned by 
the third party. What appellants attempted to do at the trial 
was to retroactively divide a strip of land belonging to the 
plaintiff and his predecessors, between the owners of Lots 1 
and 2 of Merrywood in Section 22 and between the owners 
of Lot 26 of the Old Arm Chair subdivision of Section 15 
in defiance of every principle of law. 
There is no evidence that any fence was maintained at 
any location. Through A. Z. Richards the appellants attempted 
13 
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to introduce evidence of a survey by his partner, H. G. Hall, 
in 1931. Mr. Richards admitted that his partner was instructed 
to survey the lands described in the deeds Exhibits 14-D and 
15-D, but that Mr. Hall disregarded the descriptions in the 
deeds. There is no reference whatsoever to any fence in either 
deed. (R. 469) . Two courses stated in the field book of Mr. 
Hall admittedly go in the wrong direction. Mr. Richards 
stated that "south 49° 45' west" shown in the Hall field-book 
should be "south 49° 45' east/' and that north 83 ° 25' east!) 
should read "north 83 o 25' west." (R. 441-442). Instead of 
starting where the deed descriptions required a surveyor to 
start, Mr. Hall did not bother to measure from the northwest 
corner of Section 15, but started at "a stake lying on the ground 
near the northwest corner of the tract." (R. 439). Mr. Hall 
found some fence posts and he projected the lines of his survey 
according to those fence posts. Mr. Richards admitted that 
the fence posts did not coincide with the deed descriptions 
(R. 458), and that Mr. Hall went 58 feet farther south than 
the point where stake 31 is described in the deed (R. 469, 
471). Mr. Hall projected his "fence line" across Mountair 
Road, although there never was a gate there. (R. 472). The 
fence was not continuous, for Mr. Hall found only one post 
in place in a distance of 204 feet, and he actually pulled his 
descriptions 58 feet farther south than the calls specified in 
the deed. (R. 473). Mr. Richards stated that he was not 
satisfied with the work done, and he knew Mr. Hall did not 
follow the calls in the deed, but he merely had Mr. Hall go 
back and tie the fence posts to Contrary Girl Rock. (R. 443-
445, 469, 475). Such survey was incompetent evidence. There 
was no continuous fence. There was no enclosure of any land 
by a fence. 
David Burt Affleck, third-party defendant and respondent, 
who deeded to Grant Morgan by Exhibits 14-D and 15-D lands 
in Section 15 only, lived in the canyon near the property in 
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question from 1911 on, and he testified that he was not aware 
of any fence until 1935, when he put one up along the creek 
at the insistence of his wife because she was afraid little 
children would get into the creek. He said that fence remained 
up until 1941 when he went into the army. He testified that 
the fence was not up when he returned in 1944, and there was 
no fence up in 1949 when he first saw Grant Morgan in the 
canyon. (R. 680-681). Mr. Affleck went up the canyon to 
look at the property in September 1959. He saw some cedar 
posts with some wire on them. The posts he put in during 
1935 were not cedar. When he first went up in September 
1959 those posts were not there, and in November 1959 
when he inspected the posts they looked like they had just 
been put in. (R. 681-682). David Burt Affleck never had any 
conversation at any time with Grant Morgan about boundaries. 
(R. 682). 
Grant Morgan testified that when he bought the land from 
David Burt Affleck in 1951 there was still part of a fence 
and he took part of it down. (R. 515-517). There was no 
testimony that any land was ever enclosed by a fence. 
The Gudgell survey of 195 7 was authorized by Grant 
Morgan. At the time of the deposition of Grant Morgan his 
counsel stated that defendants were relying on the survey 
made in 1957. (Exhibits 30-P and 64-P). The survey plat 
clearly shows that the deeds to Grant Morgan do not describe 
any part of the property described in the complaint. No wonder 
Grant Morgan testified that he was "dissatisfied" with such 
survey and had Mr. Gudgell make another survey in the fall 
of 1959. (R. 577). 
The "survey" made by Mr. Gudgell with plat dated 
November 30, 1959, (Exhibits 17-D and 18-D), was anything 
but a survey of the deed descriptions. Mr. Gudgell admitted 
that his survey of 1957 as platted on Exhibits 30-P and 64-P 
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followed the deed descriptions. He said he could not find the 
northwest corner of Section 15 in the fall of 1959, which 
is· the corner to which the deed descriptions to Grant Morgan 
from David Burt Affleck are tied. He knew that the south-
west corner of Section 15 had been set by A. D. Ferron in 
1891 at a point 80 chains south of the northwest corner of 
Section 15, but he did not attempt to measure from that 
corner. (R. 264). Mr. Gudgell said he tied his 1959 survey 
to a nonexistent corner-a corner which was destroyed during 
the Government Resurvey of 1927. (R. 292). He repeatedly 
referred to it as the "Hanson corner" and as the "old original 
corner," but he did not know who set such an alleged monu-
ment. He admitted: "I am not saying that the old original 
corner was set by Hanson. I don't know who it was set by." 
(R. 259). He admitted that what was called the "Hanson 
corner'' did not correspond with what Hanson stated in his 
field notes that he had established. (R. 273). The markings 
were different. He admitted that the line which A. P. Hanson 
said he ran in 1902 as the resurvey of the south line of Section 
15 was located 8.5 chains north of the Ferron south line of 
Section 15 as established in 1891, and that Hanson said he 
put in a new section corner for the southwest corner of 
Section 15 because he could not find the original Ferron 
corner. (R. 282-283). Mr. Gudgell assumed that the destroyed 
"monument" which he referred to as the "original corner" 
and as the "Hanson corner" was a government survey monu-
ment, and that "I am not saying that quarter comer was 
Hanson's or was Ferron's. I say we used the quarter corner 
referred to in these notes. Who put it in, I don't know." 
(R. 284). He said he knew that the Cadastral Engineer "has 
a reason" when he destroys a monument. (R. 289) . Mr. 
Gudgell knew that the property descriptions were not tied 
to any Hanson corner. He knew that the Old Arm Chair 
plat of 1901 was based on the Ferron survey of Section 15 
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in 1891 because that was the only government survey which 
had been made prior to 1901, and that the 0 ld Arm Chair 
Survey could not have referred to anything in the Hanson 
survey because it was not made until 1902. (R. 284). Mr. 
Gudgel! admitted that Exhibit 18-D is in error in referring 
to the "original south quarter corner of Section 15" as having 
been established in 1890, since the Ferron survey was not 
made until 1891 and Ferron did not set the south quarter 
corner. (R. 276-277, 305). 
Mr. Gudgel! admitted that he did not run into any fence 
in 1957 in making his survey to the corner of the house. (R. 
316-317). He admitted that by Exhibit 18-D he placed the 
property description of land deeded by David Burt Affleck 
to Grant Nlorgan a little over 3 7 feet farther to the south 
than what is specified in the deeds themselves. (R. 303-304). 
He admitted that "stake 31" mentioned in the deed is 43.79 
feet north of the section line as it is now located, if the deed 
description is observed. (R. 300-301). The cross-examination 
of Mr. Gudgell illustrates that the 1959 survey was made of 
fence posts, and some sections of a fence which did not exist 
when his 195 7 survey was made. As indicated by the testimony 
of David Burt Affleck, at least a part of that fence was put 
up after this lawsuit commenced. The 1959 survey was invalid. 
It did not pay any attention to the deed descriptions which were 
supposed to be surveyed. It arbitrarily moved the property 
more than 3 7 feet farther south than called for by the deeds 
themselves, and the descriptions were not tied to any gov-
ernment monument, but to an assumed "quarter corner" which 
does not exist and was never part of a government survey. 
The contention of Grant Morgan that he bought the land 
described in the complaint from David Burt Affleck and wife 
is utterly false. Grant Morgan never received a deed from 
anyone which describes any part of that land. Exhibits 14-D 
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and 15-D, are the only deeds or instruments ever signed 
by David Burt Affleck and wife, and both A. Z. Richards 
and George B. Gudgell III admitted that the deed descriptions 
do not cover any part of the land described in the complaint. 
There was no discussion between Grant Morgan and David 
Burt Affleck with respect to the purchase of the land described 
in those two deeds. (R. 565). David Burt Affleck offered his 
property for sale in 1951 for $7,500. (R. 682). Grant Morgan 
testified on deposition that in 1951 he told a real estate 
broker that he wanted "to buy that particular place and he 
arranged to buy it for me" and that the sum of $4,500 was 
paid as the purchase price. Mr. Morgan testified also that 
the real estate broker carried out his instructions in the acqui-
sition of the property; that he had his real estate broker contact 
Burt Affleck to make the~deal, and that he believed his own 
real estate broker prepared the deeds. Grant Morgan admitted 
that he accepted those deeds and that he received an abstract 
of title. (R. 565-566). Mr. Morgan said he could not remember 
that he ever told anyone that he claimed title to any land 
other than what was described in those two deeds. (R. 567). 
Exhibit 64-P is the survey plat covering the 195 7 survey 
made by Mr. Gudgell which was used by counsel for Mr. 
Morgan on the deposition. (R. 569). Said exhibit was Exhibit 
2 on the deposition of Grant Morgan. During the deposition 
the following discussion occurred: 
"MR. PRATT: I think the record can show that I 
have put in the figure 31 and the figure 32, which would 
be along what appears to be the general south boundary 
of the Morgan property, what is marked as the Morgan 
property, the north and larger piece of Morgan prop-
erty. 
''MR. REIMANN: The property which he acquired 
from David Burt Affleck? 
"MR. PRATT: Yes." (R. 569). 
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During the deposition counsel for Grant Morgan also 
stated with respect to Exhibit 64-P: 
"Let me say this: The plat that we have marked here 
as Exhibit 2 is a plat made pursuant to a survey for 
Dr. Pendleton and is the one that we would rely on 
as showing the correct location of these properties and 
the descriptions." (R. 569-5 70) . 
Grant Morgan admitted on deposition: 
"Q. Well, then according to the plat which has been 
prepared by Bush and Gudgell the tract which is de-
scribed in the complaint does not join onto the tract 
which was deeded to you or the two tracts deeded to 
you by David Burt Affleck and his wife, isn't that true? 
"A. That seems correct." (R. 5 70). 
The appellants claimed "title by adverse possession" at 
the trial, but their claims were and are without substance 
' for the following reasons: (a) Neither Grant Morgan nor 
his wife ever receive~ a deed of conveyance which describes 
any portion of the land. (b) The land has never been enclosed 
by a fence. (c) Appellants have never had exclusive possession 
for a consecutive period of 7 years. (d) Appellants have never 
paid any taxes on said land. Exhibits 44-D, 45-D, and 46-D 
consist of statements of taxes paid on land descriptions in 
the deeds to Grant Morgan, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D. It was 
expressly stated that the Morgans did not claim that taxes 
were paid on any descriptions except what are contained in 
the two deeds. (R. 492-494). Since the deed descriptions 
in the deeds to Grant Morgan dated June 2, 1951, and 
February 9, 1952, do not cover any portion of the land de-
scribed in the complaint, Grant Morgan did not prove any 
step essential to establish title by adverse possession. 
On deposition, Grant Morgan falsely claimed that he 
acquired title to the land described in the complaint from 
David Burt Affleck. At the trial Grant Morgan asserted that 
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he acquired title from his father and "from the Bell boys," 
although ·he received no deed from them covering any part 
of the land described in the complaint. (R. 5 75). His claims 
of title were utterly barren of fact or substance. 
POINT 2 
CONTRARY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANTS, 
THE COURT DID NOT QUIET TITLE IN GORDON 
BURT AFFLECK AND WIFE TO ANY LAND NORTH 
OF THE "HANSON SOUTH QUARTER CORNER OF 
SECTION 15." 
The trial court adjudged that plaintiffs and respondents 
Gordon Burt Affleck and wife are owners of the following 
described tract of land (R. 78) : 
Beginning at a point which is South 8 5° 57' 3 5" 
East 26.83 feet from a cross chiseled on "Contrary 
Girl Rock," a survey monument, which cross chiseled 
on said "Contrary Girl Rock" has been computed to 
be South 85 o 56' West 691.95 feet from the relocated 
North quarter corner of Section 22, Township 1 South, 
Range 2 East, Salt Lake Meridian, (which point of 
beginning is also the Northwesterly corner of Lot 1 
of Merrywood, an unrecorded plat) ; and from said 
beginning point running thence East 207.45 feet; 
thence North 48.70 feet, more or less, to the North 
line of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 2 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian, (said North line of said Section 
22 also being the North line of Tract 38 of the Gov-
ernment Resurvey of said Section 22) ; thence west 
along the North line of said Section 22 to a point where 
the North line of Section 22 is intersected by the east-
erly boundary line of Mountair Road; thence South-
easterly along the Easterly boundary line of said Mount-
air Road to the point of beginning. 
The argument of appellants under Point I of their brief 
at pages 8 to 10 that "~he court erred in quieting title in 
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respondents to the property north of the Hanson quarter 
corner of Section 15,'' is a misstatement of the contents of 
the judgment and decree, and a plain distortion of the facts 
pertaining to the government surveys. Appellants refrained 
from quoting the description contained in the decree for 
the reason that to quote it would refute their specious conten-
tions. On page 9 of their brief appellants make the following 
assertion which falsely implies that by the conveyance of title 
to plaintiffs there was some scheme to push the boundary 
over into Section 15: "Apparently in 1957, for the first time 
there is a conveyance which attempts to extend the North 
line of Section 22 North of the original North line as estab-
lished by Hanson." There never was any attempt "to extend 
the North line of Section 22 North of the original North line 
as established by Hanson." Counsel for appellants point to 
no language which could possibly have the result which is 
charged. 
The description of plaintiffs' land as set out in the decree 
hereinabove quoted makes no reference to any "Hanson line." 
As counsel for appellants should know, the section line run 
by A. P. Hanson as the south line of Section 15 and north 
line of Section 22 was not the original line at all, for the 
original line was established on the Ferron survey in 1891. 
Said Hanson line which appellants improperly designate as 
the "original line" was a resurvey line according to the express 
declarations of Hanson himself. Instead of being located 
south of the north line of Section 22 established and marked 
on the Government Resurvey of Sections 22 and 23 in 1927 
as appellants seek to induce this Honorable Court to believe, 
the Hanson resurvey line was approximately 561 feet north 
of the original Ferron south line of Section 15. The Ferron 
line was retraced and reestablished on the Government Resurvey 
in 1927. 
The falsity of the argument of appellants is illustrated 
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by Exhibit 35-P, which is a plat prep(lred by Jean R. Driggs, 
Sr. Said exhibit shows the relative location and position on 
the ground (a) of the south line of Section 15 as surveyed by 
A. D. Ferron in 1891, (b) the survey of Section 22 by A. P. 
Hanson in 1902, and (c) the Government Resurvey of Section 
22 in 1927. Appellants' engineers did not dispute the correct-
ness of Exhibit 3 5-P. When confronted with the statements 
contained in the field notes, Mr. Gudgell admitted that Hanson's 
resurvey line of the north line of Section 22 appears to have 
been located about 8.5 chains (561 feet) north of the Ferron 
south line of Section 15. (R. 286). The excuse A. P. Hanson 
gave on July 8, 1902, for resurveying the south line of Section 
15 and north line of Section 22 which previously had been 
established on the Ferron survey of 1891 was "Being unable 
to find any trace of the cor. of sees. 15, 16, 21 and 22 upon 
which to close my survey." (Exhibit 33-P, Book A-292, page 
373). 
The excuse given by Hanson for his resurvey line was 
untenable, for he could have found the corner set by Ferron 
in 1891 to mark the corner to Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22, if 
he had taken the trouble to look for it at the location described 
by Ferron. Exhibit 32-P covers a portion of the Ferron field 
notes in Book A-228, page 102: "80.00 (chains) On line in 
place marked a stationary boulder 4 x 4 x 2 feet above ground 
with a cross (X) and 3 notches on S. & E. edges and raised 
a stone mound 1lf2 ft. high, 2 ft. base alongside for cor. to 
Sees. 15, 16, 21 & 22." As shown by Exhibit 5-P, the J. H. 
Evers survey in 1901 of Old Arm Chair subdivision in the 
southwest quarter of Section 15 showed the southwest corner 
of Section 15 to be a "Stationary Ledge marked with X & 3 
notches East & South sides." The terms .. stake #31" and .. stake 
#32" in the deed descriptions Exhibits 14-D and 15-D origi-
nated in the Old Arm Chair survey, and are indicated on 
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Exhibit 5-P. Apparently J. H. Evers in 1901 had no difficulty 
in finding the Ferron corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. 
Howard W. Miller, the U.S. Cadastral Engineer, executed 
the Government Resurvey of Sections 22 and 23 in 1926 and 
1927, Exhibits 6-P and 34-P. He had no difficulty in finding 
the original Ferron corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22 in 
1927. As shown in his field notes, Exhibit 34-P, (Book A-491, 
page 399) in retracing the section line as established by A. D. 
Ferron, from the reestablished corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 
and 23, Mr. Miller ran the line South 89 ° 39' West 80.02 
chains to "The original Ferron cor. of sees. 15, 16, 21 and 22, 
which is a red sandstone boulder or outcropping, 4 ft. high 
and 4 ft. wide, facing SE., the top of which is marked with 
a cross, with 3 grooves E. and 3 grooves S. of cross, and 
witnessed by a scattered mound of stone. This cor. monument 
is in a good state of preservation." By the Government Re-
survey of 1927 the Hanson resurveyed "south line of Section 
15 and north line of Section 22" was superseded and termi-
nated. 
The contention of appellants on page 10 of their brief 
that "the Court erred in quieting title in the respondents to 
anything North of the original North section line of the 
Hanson Survey," is patently absurd. In the first place, the 
Hanson north line was not the original section line, but an 
invalid resurvey line. In making a resurvey it is the duty of 
the engineer to reestablish the line where it was originally 
located. See Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530, 70 P.2d 154. A. P. 
Hanson paid no attention to the location of the original Ferron 
South line of Section 15, which was the original north line of 
Section 22. Hanson arbitrarily set a new corner 561 feet north 
and west of the Ferron corner, which was a "limestone 17 
x 7 x 5 ins. 12 ins. in the ground for cor. of sees. 15, 16, 21 
and 22 marked 1 Son N. E., 2 EonS. E. faces with 3 notches 
on S. and E. edges." (Book A-292, page 373, Exhibit 33-P). 
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Mr. Hanson surveyed Section 22 with an acreage of 696.98 
acres or nearly 57 acres in excess of a standard section. Since 
he ran his resurvey line about 561 feet north of the Ferron 
south line of Section 15, about 70 acres of Section 22 as sur-
veyed by Hanson overlapped onto Section 15 as Section 15 
had been surveyed by A. D. Ferron. 
The supplemental group instructions, Group 160, Utah, 
dated February 27, 1926, in the office of Cadastral Engineer, 
specified: 
"These supplemental special instructions provide 
reestablishment of the south boundary of Sections 13 
to 18 inclusive, Township 1 South, Range 2 East, 
surveyed by A. D. Ferron, also an independent resurvey 
of the areas of this township by A. P. Hanson in 1902, 
plat approved 1903." (R. 328). 
On page 7 of the supplemental instruments for the Gov-
ernment Resurvey commenced in 1926 it is stated: 
''The third latitudinal section line selected as the 
limiting north boundary for these resurveys was sur-
veyed generally as an offset line by A. D. Ferron in 
1891. A. P. Hanson claims to have resurveyed this 
line in 1902, but his surveys appear to be spurious and 
his record may be entirely disregarded. As a result of 
the investigation, it is believed that the original Ferron 
corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22 is the only original 
corner along this line." (R. 328). 
The Government Resurvey of Sections 22 and 23 in 
192 7 tied that survey to the existing corners of the Hanson 
Survey of 1902 as well as to the existing corners of the Ferron 
survey of 1891. The Government Resurvey of 1927 terminated 
the overlap of the Hanson survey of Section 22 onto the south 
561 feet of Section 15. There can be no question about the 
fact that Hanson's survey of Section 22 extended about 561 
feet north over onto Section 15. The distance from the East 
quarter corner of Section 22 north to the alleged closing corner 
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of Section 14 clearly shows that overlap into Section 15. The 
same is true with respect to the west boundary of Section 
22 as surveyed by Hanson. From his resurvey line Hanson 
said he went south 21.30 chains to the creek. The distance 
to the creek south of the Ferron corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 
and 22 is only 16.15 chains, although the creek is intersected 
at a point farther to the southwest as illustrated on Exhibit 
35-P. 
The topography described in the Hanson field notes on 
his resurvey of the south line of Section 15, does not fit the 
topography described on the Government Resurvey in 1927. 
From the East quarter corner of Section 22 as set by A. P. 
Hanson in 1902 (which corner is still in place and was marked 
as an angle point of Tract 37 of the Government Resurvey 
of 1927), Hanson went North 0° 21' West 45.72 chains 
instead of 40 chains to "Intersect E. and W. line 2.66 chs. 
N. 89° 57' E. of cor. of sees. 14, 15, 22 and 23 as reestablished 
by me July 2, 1902, and described under resurveys, subdivision 
of this Tp. Book S." (Exhibit 33-P, Book A-292, page 339). 
Hanson states that he set a sandstone 18 x 8 x 5 inches at that 
point for a closing corner of Sections 22 and 23. He then 
went back 45.72 chains where he "Set a quartzite stone 17 x 
8 x 6 ins. 12 ins. in the ground for IA sec. cor. marked JA on 
W. face; raised a mound of stone 2 ft. base 11;2 ft. high W. 
of cor." The Hanson east line of Section 22 was 5.72 chains 
in excess of a mile. 
The west line of Section 22 as resurveyed in 1927 was 
only 77.26 chains in length as compared with 87.18 chains 
as the length of the Hanson west line of Section 22 as surveyed 
in 1902. The Hanson west line was 9.92 chains longer than 
the 1927 Government Resurvey west line. However, the 
south line of the Hanson survey of Section 22 was found to 
be 1.42 chains south of the south line of Section 22 as re-
surveyed in 1927. By subtracting 1.42 chains from 9.92 chains 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
we get a difference of 8.5 chains ( 561 feet) as the length of 
the Hanson west line of Seeton 22 which extended n·orth of 
the north line of Section 22 as reestablished on the 1927 
Government Resurvey. 
The east line of Section 22 as resurveyed in 1927 was 
only 77.80 chains as compared with 85.72 chains as the length 
of the Hanson east line of said section. The offset of 1.42 
chains cancel each other. The difference of 7.92 chains or 
521.62 feet is the distance which the Hanson relocated south-
east corner of Section 15 is north of the 1927 reestablished 
corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23. At the east the Hanson 
"resurvey" line was 521.62 feet north and at the west was 561 
feet north of the north line of Section 22 as reestablished on 
the Government Resurvey in 1927. The northwest corner of 
Section 22 as established on the Government Resurvey in 1927 
was and is the original Ferron corner established in 1891. 
That fact is conclusive in the record. 
The plat in the back of this brief is a copy of Exhibit 
3 5-P with additional data from field notes and from the record 
on appeal superimposed in red ink. Said plat illustrates the 
position of the survey lines, location of survey monuments, 
and the relative location of the controverted deed descriptions. 
An examination of this plat and of the metes and bounds 
description of the tract of land to which the court quieted 
title discloses that there is no possible basis for the argument 
that the trial court quieted title to any land north of the 
"Hanson South quarter corner of Section 15." As illustrated 
by the field notes under Point 3 of this brief, Hanson never 
claimed that he set the south quarter corner of Section 15. 
Furthermore, the description of land in· the decree makes the 
north line of said tract to which title is quieted in Gordon 
Burt Affleck and wife, the north line of Section 22 as re-
established during the Government Resurvey of 1927. The 
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north line of the land described in the decree is not north 
but about 550 feet south of the one-time Hanson north line 
of Section 22. The Hanson line was pronounced "spurious" 
by the General Land Office after a thorough investigation. 
Said Hanson north line of Section 22 was superseded and 
terminated by the 1927 Government Resurvey of Section 22 
and 23. The 1927 resurvey reestablished the original Ferron 
section line. Said Hanson "resurvey section line" has not had 
any existence since 1927. 
In attempting to put the one-time Hanson south line of 
Section 15 (north line of Section 22) south of the north line 
of Section 22 as reestablished on the 1927 Government Re-
survey, appellants indulge in a highly misleading argument. 
Appellants seek to create the impression that the Hanson 
north line of Section 22 was the original north line of said 
section, notwithstanding the fact that Hanson himself stated 
in his field notes, Exhibit 33-P, that it was a "resurvey line." 
Appellants falsely contend that the "Hanson south quarter 
corner of Section 15" was located approximately 22 feet south 
of the north line of Section 22 as reestablished on the 1927 
Government Resurvey. The inexorable fact is that Hanson 
never set the south quarter corner of Section 15, and he stated 
in his field notes that he set the north quarter corner of Section 
22 on his resurvey line, which position was 561 feet north 
and approximately 2800 feet east of the original Ferron corner 
of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. 
On page 8 of their brief the Morgans make the unique 
but absurd contention that by having a plat made of the 
Merrywood subdivision in Section 22 in 1910, Alvaro A. 
Pratt as patentee "established at that time the North quarter 
corner of Section 22, i.e., the Northeast corner of Lot 3 and 
the Northwest corner of Lot 2 of said section at a point 87° 50' 
East 822.8 feet from Contrary Girl Rock. This was 33 feet 
North of the North line of the Merrywood Subdivision. (Ex. 
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P-11." Such argument concedes that the respondents Gordon 
Burt Affleck and wife own a tract of land at least 3 3 feet in 
width. However, neither Alvaro A. Pratt nor any one else 
could legally move the section line south 22 feet (or north) 
by a private survey. Alvaro A. Pratt did not attempt to move 
the section line, but he could not have succeeded even if he 
had tried. As far as the lots in the unrecorded Merrywood 
subdivision were concerned, it would make no difference 
where any government corner might be located, for all of 
these lots were tied directly to a cross chiseled on a large 
survey monument known as .. Contrary Girl Rock." (Exhibit 
11-P). 
On page 14 of their brief appellants attempt to make it 
appear that the plaintiffs and their predecessors assumed or 
believed that the tract of land between the north line of Lots 
1 and 2 of Merrywood and the north line of Section 22 was 
only 33 feet in width, and that plaintiffs having had a mistaken 
assumption should not be permitted to claim to the section 
line where it originally existed because the surveyor who 
prepared the Merrywood plat thought that the distance was 
only 33 feet. Counsel for appellants do not make clear how 
a mistaken belief or erroneous assumption of a property 
owner can move a section line north, south, east, west or in 
any other direction from where it was originally established. 
The appellants ignore the correction deed given to Gordon 
Burt Affleck and wife, and the explantaion counsel for the 
Morgans drew out of him as the reason for the correction 
deed. (R. 624). 
Counsel misconstrue the original deed to the plaintiffs 
dated Septerpber 3, 1955, in an effort to narrow the tract to 
33 feet. That deed description starts on the north line of 
Section 22. It is elementary that the call of .. South 33 feet 
to the Northeasterly corner of said Lot 2 of Merrywood" 
conveyed the entire strip between the north line of Section 22 
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and the north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood. (Exhibit 
2-P). If counsel for appellants were correct in arguing that 
the north line of Lot 3 of Section 22 necessarily refers to the 
Hanson survey, then instead of conveying only the strip of 
ground described in the decree or between the existing section 
line and the north lines of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, such 
deed would have purportedly conveyed a tract of land nearly 
597 feet in width, for the reason that the Hanson north line 
of Section 22 was about 5 50 feet north of the tract described 
in the decree and the tract described in the decree is 48.7 feet 
in width at the east. 
Counsel for appellants infer that the deed from Alvaro 
A. Pratt did not cover all of the land to the north line of 
Section 22 as said section line is presently established. On the 
contrary, such conveyance went north of the present section 
line because the north lines of Lots 2, 3 and 4 of Section 22 
were on the Hanson's north line of Section 22. The Hanson 
line was considerably in excess of 500 feet farther north than 
the presently existing section line. The abstract of title, Exhibit 
1-P, pages 28 to 30, clearly shows that Alvaro A. Pratt and 
wife conveyed to Parker B. Pratt all of "Lots 2, 3 and 4, 
Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Merid-
ian, excepting the following tract or parcels, to-wit"; and the 
exceptions cover only metes and bounds descriptions of Lots 
1 to 7, 20, 32 and 34 of Merrywood, which exceptions do not 
cover any of the land described in the complaint. The argument 
that the north boundary of the Pratt lands in Section 22 was 
south of the north line of Section 22 as reestablished on the 
Government Resurvey in 1927 is palpably absurd. According 
to the Hanson survey, Lots 2, 3 and 4 of Section 22 overlapped 
into Section 15 from 521.62 feet to 561 feet. 
Contrary to the contradictory arguments of the Morgans, 
the court did not quiet title "to anything North of the original 
North section line of the Hanson Survey," for the reason that 
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the north line of the Hanson survey was a "resurvey line" (not 
the original section line) which was from 5 21.62 feet to as 
much as 561 feet north of the presently existing section line 
as reestablished in the Government Resurvey in 1927. The 
1917 resurvey reestablished the section line where it was 
originally established by A. D. Ferron in 1891. The original 
Ferron northwest corner of Section 22 was found in a good 
state of preservation. The 1927 resurveyed section line had to 
be anchored to that original monument. 
POINT 3 
APPELLANTS HAVE NO CAPACITY TO IMPEACH 
THE 1927 GOVERNMENT RESURVEY OF SECTION 22. 
THERE IS NO MERIT TO THE ARGUMENT THAT "THE 
COURT ERRED IN BASING TITLE UPON THE RESUR-
VEY.'' 
Appellants attempt to create title confusion by an un-
warranted attempt to impeach the official Government Resurvey 
in 1927 of the south line of Section 15 and north line of 
Section 22. Counsel do not and cannot point out in any par-
ticular wherein the 1927 survey executed by Howard W. 
Miller, U. S. Cadastral Engineer, was in error. In their 
argument, appellants ignore the fact that the original corner 
of Sections 14, 15, 21 and 22 and the original corner of 
Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23 were established in 1891 on the 
survey executed by A. D. Ferron. The Morgans and their 
witnesses repeatedly referred to a non-existent monument 
which was officially destroyed by the United States Government 
during the resurvey in 1927, as the .. old original corner" and 
as the "original Hanson corner," when there is no evidence 
that such rock was ever identified with any of the United 
States surveys. Contrary to the arguments of counsel for 
appellants, there is no evidence that A. P. Hanson in 1902 
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established his north quarter corner of Section 22 at any point 
other than where he stated in his .field notes that he established 
it, which point was 37.38 chains west on his resurvey line from 
his "relocated" southeast corner of Section 15. Hanson never 
set the south quarter corner of Section 15. 
It is not disputed that the Government Resurvey of 1927 
of Section 22 was an official survey of the United States, nor 
that its purpose was to retrace the original Ferron south line of 
Section 15, etc. As stated in Knight v. United Land Association. 
142 U. S. 173, 35 L. Ed. 974, 979, 12 S. Ct. 259, with respect 
to government resurveys: 
"It is a well settled rule of law that the power to 
make and correct surveys of the public lands belongs 
exclusively to the political department of government, 
and that the action of that department, within the scope 
of its authority, is unassailable in the courts except by 
a direct proceeding . . . '' 
In Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530, 70 P. 2d 154 at 157, this 
Court said: 
" ... Official surveys for the United States govern-
ment are not open to attack between private parties 
in disputes over boundary lines." 
In Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 
141 P. 2d 160, the following rule was stated: 
"A survey monument relocated by proper authority 
is presumed to be placed where the surveyor originally 
located it, until and unless the contrary is shown by 
competent evidence." 
There can be no question about the fact that on the 
Government Resurvey of 1927, the U. S. Cadastral Engineer 
retraced the south line of Section 15 and north line of Section 
22 as that land was established originally by A. D. Ferron 
in 1891. The 1927 Government Resurvey superseded the 
Hanson .. resurvey." The Ferron corner common to Sections 
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15, 16, 21 and 22 was found in a good state of preservation, 
being an outcropping or boulder of red standstone 4 feet 
high and 4 feet long and 2 feet thick, marked with a cross, and 
3 grooves on the south and east sides. 
As shown by the field notes of the 1927 resurvey, "The 
original.1,4 sec. cor. bet. sees. 14 and 15 is a red standstone, 
16 x 10 x 6 ins., lying on the ground, marked 1h on one face, 
and witnessedby deeply embedded stones around cor. I reset 
stone 10 ins. in the ground marked 1,4 on W. face, and along-
side same, set an iron post, 3 feet long, 1 in. in dia., 28 ins. 
in the ground for 1,4 sec. cor., with brass cap marked . . . " 
(Exhibit 34-P, Book A-491 page 393). After determining 
that the east line of Section 15 had a bearing of South 0 ° 40' 
East, the engineers chained on that course 40 chains to a point 
where they reestablished the corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 
and 23, marked with an iron post 2 inches in diameter with 
a brass cap. (Book A-491, page 394). The reestablished 
corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23 is 80.02 chains North 
89 ° 39' East from the original Ferron corner of Sections 15, 
16, 21 and 22. 
During the Government Resurvey of Sections 22 and 23 
m 1927, the U. S. Cadastral Engineer found at a point 1.97 
chains (130.02 feet) east and 2links (1.32 feet) south of the 
reestablished corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23, "a sand-
stone, 10 x 12 x 12 ins. above ground, firmly set, marked 
with 3 notches on E., 3 notches on W. and 2 notches on S. 
edge;" from which he found certain "bearing trees" (B. T.) 
referring to such monument. He stated: "The above stone 
and bearing trees, while marked for the cor. of sees. 14, 15, 
22 and 23, cannot be identified as belonging to either the 
Ferron or Hanson survey systems in this township; therefore, 
I conclude that it is of local origin and destroy the stone 
and deface the bearing trees." (Book A-491, pages 396-397). 
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On page 12 of their brief appellants attempt to make 
a big play over an error in the 1927 field notes in referring 
to a fictitious monument which was destroyed during the 
resurvey of 1927 as the "Hanson :LA sec. cor." Appellants 
argue: 
" . . . It is also clear that in making this relocation, 
Miller definitely pinpointed and recognized the exist-
ence of the Hanson South Quarter corner of Section 
15, stating: 
" 'South, 34 lks. distant is the Hanson IA, sec. 
cor. So. boundary Sec. 15, which is a red standstone 
10 x 12 x 4 ins. above ground, firmly set, marked 
IA, on N. face; no accessories to cor. I destroy this 
cor.' (Ex. P. 34, at p. 60 thereof). 
"This location is further tied to the Hanson survey 
plat (Ex. D-21) according to Mr. Gudgell's testi-
mony above referred to . . . '' 
Contrary to such argument such location was not tied to 
anything in the Hanson field notes nor to the Hanson survey 
plat, nor even mentioned in the Hanson field notes. While 
the surveyor erroneously referred to such destroyed monument 
as a "Hanson IA, cor.'', the field notes of the Government Re-
survey of 1927 and the Hanson field notes of 1902 clearly 
demonstrate that such destroyed "corner" was not set by 
Hanson. Hanson made no pretense that he ever set the south 
quarter corner of Section 15. As stated in Exhibit 34-P, Book 
A-491, page 481, field note of the Government Resurvey of 
1927: 
" ... No evidence of the Hanson surveys of the N. 
Bdy. of sec. 22 can be found and his reported closings 
upon the former surveys in this vicinity are notoriously 
fictitious. Indications are that land owners have used 
the Ferron cor. of sees. 15, 16, 21 and 22 to locate their 
claims and ran in cardinal directions therefrom. There-
fore, the N. bdy. of the Hanson survey of sec. 22 is 
terminated on the reestablished S. bdy. of sees. 14 and 
15." 
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We have heretofore pointed out under Point 2 of this 
brief that the Hanson north line of Section 22 (south line 
of Section 15) was an unauthorized resurvey line and that 
his relocated southwest corner of Section 15 was placed at 
a point 561 feet north (and west) of the Ferron corner. 
Hanson's relocated southeast corner of Section 15 was at a 
point 521.62 feet north of the corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 
and 23 as reestablished on the 1927 Government Resurvey. 
It is significant that in his field notes Hanson did not describe 
any terrain which fits the south line of Section 15 as re-
established on the 1927 Government Resurvey. From his 
"relocated" southeast corner of Section 15, Mr. Hanson said 
he ran his resurvey line west. At 34.25 chains he said "Top 
of spur runs S. 90 ft. high," which cannot be identified with 
anything in the vicinity of the reestablished section line. At 
37.38 chains west of his relocated southeast corner of Section 
15, Mr. Hanson 
"Set a sandstone 18 x 8 x 4 ins. 12 ins. in the ground 
for 1;4 cor. of sec. 22 marked 1;4 of S face; raised a 
mound of stones 2 ft. base 11h ft. high S of cor." 
(Exhibit 33-P, Book A-292, page 347). 
It is significant that on his resurvey line Hanson said 
that he set the north quarter for Section 22, but he did not 
set the south quarter corner for Section 15. Hanson offset 
Section 22 from Section 15. The south quarter corner would 
be the southwest corner of the southeast quarter of Section 
15. To set the south quarter corner of Section 15 Hanson 
would have had to set it approximately 41 chains west from 
his relocated southeast corner of Section 15, because his 
resurvey line was 82.02 chains instead of 80 chains in length. 
However, he only set the north quarter corner of Section 22. 
Reference to the stone monument which was destroyed in 
1927 as the "Hanson 1,4 sec. cor. So. boundary Sec. 15" was 
and is erroneous for the reason that Hanson never set a 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
quarter corner for the South quarter corner of Section 15, 
and such destroyed stone cannot be identified with the Hanson 
survey or any other government authorized survey. 
It should be noted that there were accessories to the 
North quarter corner of Section 22 which Hanson set in 1902, 
consisting of a mound of rocks 2 feet at the base. There were 
no accessories to the rock monument which was found in 
1927. Furthermore, Hanson marked his monument with "lt4" 
on the south face, which would be proper. The rock which 
was destroyed in 1927 which appellants have improperly 
referred to as the "original Hanson corner" ana as the "original 
corner," was marked "lt4" on the north face. Consequently, 
such rock was not in the place nor position where Hanson 
said he set his quarter corner. According to the field notes 
of Hanson as platted on Exhibit 3 5-P, the Hanson north 
quarter corner of Section 22 was set at a point which is about 
560 feet northerly from the place where the rock monument 
was found in 1927 which was destroyed. 
Perhaps the most decisive proof that the destroyed monu-
ment was not the Hanson quarter corner is the fact that they 
were of different sizes and dimensions. The rock which was 
destroyed in 1927 was a red standstone 10 x 12 x 4 inches 
above the ground. The North quarter corner of Section 22 
set by Hanson in 1902 was 18 x 8 x 4 inches above the ground. 
It is conceivable that a rock monument might diminish in 
size by erosion, but it is not conceivable that one of its dimen-
sions will increase in size with age. Thus, the two monuments 
were different in size. One was marked JA on the north face 
and the other was marked JA on the south face. The monument 
set by Hanson had accessories consisting of a mound of stones. 
The monument which was destroyed had no accessories what-
soever. The rock which was destroyed in 1927 was found in 
a location which was about 560 feet southerly from the place 
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where Hanson stated in his field notes that he set his north 
quarter corner of Section 22. 
On the Government Resurvey of the section line in 1927 
in going west from the reestablished corner of Sections 14, 
15, 22 and 23, the surveyors reached the Mountair Road at 
50.60 chains. (Book A-491, page 399). On Hanson's resurvey 
line, west from his relocated southeast corner of Section 15, 
he reached the road ."in bottom of gulch" at 66.15 chains. 
Hanson in July, 1902, reached the road 1026.30 feet farther 
to the west than did ·the U. S. Cadastral Engineer in 1927 
for the reason that Hanson's resurvey line was about 561 feet 
farther north, and the road winds to the northwest. To further 
demonstrate that Hanson's resurvey line was some distance 
over into Section 15, all one needs to do is to look at his 
survey plat, which shows the road running through Lot 4 
of Section 22. It is undisputed that there is no road through 
what was formerly known as Lot 4 of Section 22. By an invalid 
resurvey, Hanson arbitrarily tried to annex about 70 acres of 
Section 15 to add to Section 22 to make Section 22 an over-
size section. 
Mr. Gudgell repeatedly referred to the rock monument 
which was destroyed in 1927 as the "old original corner," 
and as the "Hanson corner," but he admitted that he did 
not know who set it. He said, "I am not saying that the old 
original corner was set by Hanson. I don't know who it was 
set by.'' (R. 259). Mr. Gudgell recognized that what he called 
the "Hanson corner" did not correspond with the quarter 
corner which Hanson stated in his field notes that he had 
established. (R. 273). He also said, "I am not saying that 
quarter corner was Hanson's or was Ferron's." (R. 284). 
Neither Ferron nor Hansen ever set the south quarter of Section 
15. The south quarter corner of Section 15 was never estab-
lished until 1927 when it was established on the Government 
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Resurvey. It is known as the relocated or reestablished 1\Iorth 
quarter corner of Section 22 and also as the South quarter 
corner of Section 15. 
The monument which was found in 1927 south of the 
section line with a 1)! marked on the north face was never 
established on any government survey. It was not an official 
monument, and it was properly destroyed. In this connection 
it is interesting to note that appellants do not complain of 
the destruction of the monument which was only 1.32 feet 
south of the reestablished section line between Sections 14 
and 23. Only two monuments were destroyed on said 1927 
survey. The Hanson east quarter corner of Section 22 was 
not destroyed. It was marked by an angle point and tied to 
the relocated east quarter corner of Section 22. The Cadastral 
Engineer did not destroy any monument which was set where 
the field notes stated that it was set, nor if it could be identified 
with any prior government survey. 
Appellants argue that the section line was pushed farther 
to the north by the Government Resurvey in 1927. In connection 
with their unfounded argument they cite United States v. 
State Investment Co., 264 U. S. 204, and New Mexico v. 
Colorado, 267 U. S. 30. We fully agree with the doctrine 
set forth in those cases. The difficulty is that appellants have 
the facts in reverse. If the section line was "moved" it was 
not movea north but south to where it was located in 1891. 
Consequently, those cases cannot possibly assist the Morgans. 
Those cases might be applicable to assail the invalid Hanson 
resurvey of the north line of Section 22 in 1902, since Hanson 
disregarded the original section line as surveyed by Ferron 
in 1891 when Hanson attempted to slice off from 561 feet 
to 521.62 feet from the south side of Section 15 and include 
that area of about 70 acres in Section 22. The 1927 Govern-
ment Resurvey remedied the unlawful overlap. In defiance 
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of the facts appellants have tried to make it appear that the 
Hanson north line of Section 22 was south of the north line 
of Section 22 as reestablished on the Government Resurvey 
in 1927 when the Hanson line was from 521.62 to 561 feet 
north of the reestablished section line. The 1927 Government 
Survey of Section 22 was anchored to the original Ferron 
corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. The 1927 resurvey was 
accurate! y executed in accordancewith the rules established 
by law. 
On pages 11 and 12 of their brief, the Morgans quote 
from Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530, 70 P. 2d 154. We fully 
concur iri that quotation. The Government Resurvey of 1927 
fully complied with that rule. The original corner of Sections 
15, 16, 21 and 22 established in 1891 by Ferron was found 
in 1927 in a good state of preservation, although Hanson 
represented that he could not find it. The resurvey was accu-
rate! y executed according to law and according to the rules 
established nearly a century ago. The incompetent Hanson 
resurvey of the south line of Section 15, which was made in 
utter disergard of the rules, was terminated and superseded 
by the 1927 resurvey. 
The arguments of appellants, if adopted would create 
insurmountable confusion in the law, and place in peril every 
title in Section 15. On page 14 of their brief counsel for the 
Morgans say: 
''The Court should give recognition to the property 
descriptions and to the conveyances based upon the 
descriptions emanating from the North Quarter corner 
of Section 22, as established by Mr. Hanson. To do 
otherwise is error." 
Counsel for the Morgans seem to overlook the fact that 
none of the property descriptions in Section 15 ever were tied 
to any known or assumed monument of the Hanson survey. 
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All property descriptions of land in Section 15 were tied either 
to the northwest corner of Section 15 or to the southwest 
corner of Section 15 as that section was surveyed by A. D. 
Ferron in 1891. Inasumch as the Hanson north quarter 
corner of Seeton 22 was located at a point which was 561 feet 
north and about 2800 feet east of the Ferron southwest corner 
of Section 15, if the argument of counsel for appellants were 
taken seriously, the Morgans did not get any title to any land 
in Section 15 by either of the two deeds from David Burt 
Affleck and wife, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D, for those property 
descriptions are not only north of the original Ferron section 
line, but they are within the strip of land 521.62 feet to 561 
feet in width which Hanson tried to lop off of Section 15 
and include in Section 15 by his incompetent .. resurvey" in 
1902. 
POINT 4 
THE CONTENTION THAT "THE DECISION OF THE 
COURT IS INEQUITABLE IN REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE 
REASONABLE ENJOYMENT OF THE LAND SUR-
ROUNDING THE BURT AFFLECK HOME," DISREGARDS 
BOTH THE FACTS AND THE LAW. 
It is admitted that a suit to quiet title is equitable in nature. 
However, the plaintiffs sued in ejectment to recover damages 
for trespass. There can be no valid dispute of plaintiffs' 
record title. What defendants did to plaintiff was not "equit-
able." The defendant Grant Morgan acquired Lots 1 and 2 
of Merrywood on the south side of plaintiffs' land. In 1951 
he bought the land in Section 15 owned by David Burt Affleck. 
Sometime later Grant Morgan arbitrarily decided to .. take 
over" the land of plaintiffs and of a third party which lies 
in between. There are absolutely no equities in favor of the 
Morgans. 
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The case of Mayer v. Flynn, 46 Utah 598, 150 P. 692, 
does not support the Morgan claims. That case involved conflict-
ing conveyances. In this case Morgan never acquired any title to 
the land described in the complaint. In the Mayer case the eaves 
of defendant's house protruded over the boundary, and 
it was held that defendant was required to cut off those over-
hanging eaves. Yet, there was some evidence that defendant 
sought to avoid encroachment. This Honorable Court said 
in that case: 
" . . . Of course, where the boundaries described in 
the title papers are tied to reliable and fixed monu-
ments, so that such boundaries can with certainty be 
located on the ground, one may not go beyond such 
boundaries and hope to escape from being required to 
undo what he has done under the plea that it was done 
in good faith and by mistake. The invasion of an-
other's property rights in law, if not in morals, con-
stitutes a trespass, and the trespasser is civilly liable, 
whether it occurred in good faith under mistake of 
fact or law or otherwise ... " ( 46 Utah 607). 
It is possible that David Burt Affleck in building a house 
m 1935, half of which extended over onto the Pratt land, 
was misled by the abortive survey made by H. G. Hall in 
1931 which utterly disregarded the deed descriptions. How-
ever, it should be remembered that in 1951 Grant Morgan 
did not have any negotiations with David Burt Affleck. 
Affleck wanted to sell his property for $7,500. For some 
reason Grant Morgan did not want to deal directly with 
Affleck. Morgan had his real estate broker communicate an 
offer of $4,500. The deed which the broker had David Burt 
Affleck and wife sign on June 2, 1951, described a tract land 
in Section 15, but it did not mention any house. That deed, 
Exhibit 14-D, only conveyed that portion of the house which 
stands on that tract of land. On February 9, 1952, Morgan's 
broker told David Burt Affleck that part of the land had 
been omitted from the deed and upon request the said Afflecks 
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executed the deed, Exhibit 15-D. There were no representa-
tions made at any time to Grant Morgan by the Afflecks as 
to what they owned. 
In view of what Grant Morgan knew, he could not have 
been expected to pay David Burt Affleck much more than 
$4,500 for the Affleck property. Morgan could readily see 
that the house built some years previously by David Burt 
Affleck extended over onto lands Affleck did not own. Morgan 
admitted that in 1948 he was advised by Dr. Ralph Pendleton 
that the Reimanns had bought out the Parker B. Pratt estate 
lands in Section 22. (R. 580). Morgan admitted that he had 
negotiations with Paul E. Reimann and Dr. Pendleton for 
the possible acquisition of a strip of land 16Ij2 feet in width 
on the north side of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood. (R. 580-
582, 585-587). 
The plaintiff Gordon Burt Affleck testified that in 1950 
in the vicinity of the north line of Lot 1 of Merrywood there 
was a conversation between Affleck, Morgan and Reimann. 
The conversation related to a proposed "sale of 361;2 feet 
with 161;2 to Mr. Morgan." Affleck asked Reimann to protect 
his brother David Burt Affleck with 16Y2 feet. Reimann 
told Morgan that he would not protect him nor anyone else 
unless he obeyed the covenants if there was a septic tank. 
Morgan said he would like to have the 161;2 feet, and said 
"I hoped you could work out a deal." Referring to David 
Burt Affleck, Reimann said to Gordon Burt Affleck, "I can't 
take care of him because he hadn't paid assessments." Affleck 
said "Burt was pretty sore because the assessments had been 
abated while he was in the army." As Affleck left the confer-
ence to go back to the house, he said he wanted that property 
and had from the beginning. He told Reimann, "You must 
preserve it for my mother and father, that is all I want you 
to do." Affleck also said to Reimann in the presence of 
Morgan that if they could not get together on their exchange, 
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Affleck wanted Reimann to protect him on the piece of property 
he wanted from the beginning, and he wanted a right-of-way 
to his mother and father protected. (R. 661-664). 
Grant Morgan· never at any time purchased the portion of 
the house which stands on the property described in the com-
plaint and in the decree. He did not purchase the fish pond, 
the trees, shrubs, stream, pipeline or pumphouse. The trial 
court awarded to Grant Morgan even the portion of the 
house and pumphouse and pipeline which are on the land 
described in the complaint which Morgan never built nor 
bought nor paid for, and granted an easement on the land 
where such structures are located. Counsel for the Morgans 
says such easement "is not consistent with the facts as developed 
in the evidence, and certainly does no equity for appellants." 
We agree that there is no basis for the award of any ease-
ment to the Morgans for reasons hereinafter stated on argu-
ment of the cross-appeal. The trial court should have required 
the Morgans to move the house off the land, since the court 
awarded the Morgans the portion of the house they did not 
buy. 
Appellants complain because they say they need the use 
of the land around the house and the trees, the stream, the 
fish pond and other things which the Morgans want but never 
bought, in order to enjoy the portion of the house which 
they never bought. The Morgans make the novel but specious 
argument that those facilities on property which they do not 
own constitute appurtenances to the adjoining property al-
though none of those items are described in deeds to adjoining 
property. It is elementary that a house is a "fixture," not an 
appurtenance. Grant Morgan decided in 1951 or thereafter 
that by owning the properties on both sides, those properties 
could better be used as a "unit" by having the property belong-
ing to plaintiffs which is in the middle. Consequently, the 
Morgans say they should be awarded the permanent use of 
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the lands of the plaintiffs because of the admitted trespasses 
of the Morgans, and in effect deprive the plaintiffs of all use 
and value of property which plaintiffs purchased and leave 
nothing for the plaintiffs except the duty to pay the taxes. 
Appellants also contradict the record by pretending that 
·'these improvements were being constructed throughout the 
years with the knowledge of Paul Reimann and Gordon Burt 
Affleck." There is no such evidence. Gordon Burt Affleck 
was not aware until 1954 that Grant Morgan was making any 
alleged "improvements." The view from the road was obscured 
by brush. The cross-examination of Walter K. Fahr, who 
helped Grant Morgan, shows that Morgan and Fahr were 
diverting attention of Reimann from what was occurring on 
the land in question by trespassing on his lands farther up 
the canyon, by damming up the creek, although they rep-
resented to Reimann that they were trying to help him protect 
his property against trespassers who were turning out the water 
and washing out the road. Fahr admitted that Reimann ordered 
both Fahr and Morgan to get off his land in 1955, which most 
certainly could not be construed to constitute an approval of 
the trespasses. (R. 649-652). 
The alleged "complete unitization of this tract of land 
in connection with the summer home site" is a myth. The 
following comment on page 17 is rather impudent: "One can-
not help being impressed with the inequity which is now 
placed upon the appellants by allowing Mr. Reimann and 
Gordon Burt Affleck to come in with a title originating in 
1957, to obtain this land as a wedge between the two homes 
of the appellants." The title did not originate in 1957. It 
It originated with the United States patent. Obviously, 
Grant Morgan with knowledge of the fact that he did not 
own the land described in the complaint decided that he could 
squeeze out the plaintiffs by owning land on both sides. His 
conduct is utterly unconscionable. He is not in any position 
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to talk about "equity." The trial court was far too liberal with 
him. 
POINT 5 
THERE IS NO MERIT TO THE ARGUMENT THAT 
"THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING APPEL-
LANTS THE OPPORTUNITY OF CLAIMING RECOV-
ERY FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO THE LAND." 
In order for a defendant to be entitled to any judicial 
relief under the occupying claimants' statute, Section 57-6-4, 
U.C.A. 1953, he must satisfy each of the following require-
ments: (a) He must show "color of title" to the real estate 
on which the ·improvements are located. (b) He must prove 
that he constructed the improvements in good faith, honestly 
believeing that he had title when making the improvements. 
Day v.JonesJ 112 Utah 286, 187 P. 2d 181, and Doyle v. West 
Temple Terrace Co.J 47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180. (c) The 
claimant must prove that he rected the improvements wholly 
on the land on which his "color of title" has been adjudicated 
adversely. As stated in Uthoff v. Thompson} 176 La. 599, 
146 So. 161, the improvements for which recovery is sought 
"must be on the land of the one from whom reimbursement 
is demanded, and not wholly or partially on the land of an-
other." 
Neither Grant Morgan nor Eva Morgan ever acquired 
any title nor even a "color of title" to the real estate described 
in the complaint. The Morgans never paid any taxes assessed 
against the said real estate. The deeds to Grant Morgan do 
not describe any portion of the land described in the complaint. 
It is elementary that a deed to tracts A, C, and D which do 
not describe tract B nor any portion thereof, cannot create any 
color of title to tract B. The Morgans have no color of title 
to the land described in the complaint. 
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With respect to the house, only half of it was built on 
the land described in the complaint. Grant Morgan acquired 
title only to that portion in Section 15. Grant Morgan did not 
purchase the portion of the house which is on the land de-
scribed in the complaint, nor the pump-house nor the pipeline. 
David Burt Affleck probably could not recover himself, and 
he never assigned any alleged right of recovery to the Morgans 
for such portion of the improvements made. However, even 
if David Burt Affleck had given Grant Morgan a bill of sale 
or other instrument designed to sell and transfer to the Morgans 
the portion of the house on the land in dispute and the pump-
house and pipeline, the Morgans could not possibly recover 
for the reason that the court awarded an easement for use of 
those fixtures entirely to defendants, although the court was 
in error. The trial court in awarding the use of such fixtures 
to defendants should have ordered them to remove the same 
from the plaintiffs' property. The defendants want the im-
provements and everything around them. They want to "eat 
their cake and have it too." There is no provision under our 
occupying claimants' statute for any relief where the alleged 
improvement is partially on the land described in the decree 
and partly on some other land, nor where the claimant con-
tinues to have the use of it. 
As to the fish pond there is a question whether it is located 
on the land of plaintiffs or on land belonging to David A. 
Affleck Association, Inc., which is not a party to the suit, 
or partly on the Association land and partly on land of plain-
tiffs. David Burt Aflleck never conveyed the fish pond and 
did not purport to transfer that land on which it is located 
to Grant Morgan. The Morgans could not recover for any of 
those improvements which were made at the expense of David 
Burt Affleck, and which were never purchased by the de-
fendants. The Morgans seek to unjustly enrich themselves with 
respect to items which they never purchased nor contracted 
to purchase. 
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The only improvements which the Morgans made con-
sisted of putting a toilet on the property, making some paths, 
building a patio partially on plaintiffs' property and partially 
on Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, and part of a rock wall. As 
to the patio there could not be any recovery for the reason 
that it is only partially on the land in dispute. None of the 
alleged improvements were built in good faith with an honest 
belief that the Morgans had title. 
There was ample evidence that Grant Morgan knew he 
did not have any title whatsoever. The evidence does not 
support the contention that plaintiffs and their predecessors 
stood by and watched Morgan "make improvements," or that 
they assented to the encroachments. The activities of the 
Morgans were at least partially concealed by brush and trees. 
The admissions of Grant Morgan show that he knew there 
was some property to the north of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood 
which had been purchased by the Reimanns. He knew he 
had not purchased that property. He was aware of that 
situation in 1948. In 1950 he had negotiations with Dr. 
Pendleton and with Reimann to acquire a strip of land on 
the north side of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood 161;2 feet in 
width. All of the alleged improvements made by Morgan 
were made on that 161;2 foot strip which in 1950 he nego-
tiated to acquire from the Reimanns. Morgan was put on 
notice in 1950 during a conference with Affleck and Reimann 
that the Reimanns also owned land to the north of the 161;2 
strip which Morgan wanted the Reimanns deed to him. In 
the presence of Morgan, Gordon Burt Affleck told Reimann 
that he wanted his brother David Burt Affleck protected with 
a strip of land; that if the exchange with Morgan did not 
go through Affleck himself wanted a tract of land, and that 
he also wanted his father and mother protected with a right-
of-way. 
Grant Morgan admitted that he never paid any attention 
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to boundary linesj that he made no attempt to determine where 
his boundary line was when he started to build the patio; and 
that he was not "concerned about determining boundary lines 
at all." (R. 595-596). The alleged "parking lot" was made 
in 1950, but there is no evidence that it was on the property 
described in the complaint. The drain tile was laid within the 
boundaries of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, and there is no 
evidence that it extended over the line. Morgan said he did 
not know where the boundaries were within 20 or 25 feet, 
but he knew it was marshy along the creek. Morgan claimed 
that he put in a horseshoe court on the land in dispute some 
years ago, but he admitted that he did not know whether 
it was on the plaintiffs' land. He did not know whether the 
septic tank used in connection with the house is on the land 
in dispute. (R. 598). There is evidence that Morgan moved 
the toilet onto the land in question after 1951. Starting 1954 
Morgan started to build a patio partially on the land deeded 
to plaintiff, but brush obscured the view. 
The elements of good faith are utterly lacking. Morgan 
was utterly indifferent to boundaries. Within a year after 
negotiating to obtain title to a strip of land by exchange, 
Morgan entered onto the land following his purchase of 
property farther to the north. Morgan was on notice that the 
predecessors of plaintiffs owned the land between Lots 1 and 
2 of Merrywood and the land farther to the north in Section 
15 owned by David Burt Affleck. As pointed out in Day v. 
Jones, supra, (112 Utah 286, 187 P. 2d 181), where notice 
of lack of title is sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent 
person to investigate, ignoring such notice does not comport 
with a claim of good faith; for "appellant should have, before 
maRing the improvements, diligently and conscientiously ex-
amined the title in the light of the adverse claim. Of course, 
Morgan had no title to examine. He knew he had not received 
a deed to the property in question from anyone. The trial 
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court did not and could not possibly treat the acts of the 
Morgans as manifesting good faith. In 1955 Morgan was 
told to get off the Reimann lands. Grant Morgan's indifference 
to rights of others, his contempt for the facts brought to his 
attention, and his willful conduct in attemping to appropriate 
to his own use property which he knew he did not purchase 
and which he knew David Burt Affleck did not own, precludes 
appellants from obtaining any judicial relief. 
On page 18 appellants urge that the Morgans "upon 
obtaining the deeds from Burt Affleck intended to claim, and 
did claim, possession of all of the land south to their own 
land which they had possessed and use since 1912." That they 
intended to claim title to land which was not described in 
their deed is quite obvious; but their claims were not in good 
faith and were not asserted openly for some time. Their 
intention to take over land to which they knew they had no 
title merely aggravates their trespass. It did not give them 
color of title. It emphasizes their utter lack of good faith. 
POINT 6. 
CONTRARY TO ARGUMENT OF APPELLANTS, THE 
TRIAL COURT PERMITTED THE MORGANS TO PRE-
SENT ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE THEY COULD 
PRODUCE AS TO ALLEGED EASEMENTS, AS WELL AS 
ANY PROFFERS OF PROOF DEFENDANTS DESIRED TO 
MAKE. 
The argument of Point V in the brief of appellants is 
utterly devoid of any merit. A lot of time was wasted in court 
by the various attempts of the defendants to present evidence 
as to alleged "prescriptive" use of the plaintiffs' land. The 
defendant Morgan testified to a lot of immaterial and incom-
petent matters. He testified to a horseshoe court, a parking 
area, bridges, footpaths, and about recreational excursions, 
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but he could not show that any of those activities prior to 
1954 were conducted on any part of the plaintiffs' lands except 
occasionally. He was not regularly in the canyon until 1949. 
Counsel advised the court that the Morgans were going to 
show "prescriptive easements" and "adverse use." All the 
Morgans could show were sporadic acts of trespass during years 
prior to 1954, and repeated trespasses since 1954 whereby the 
plaintiffs were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the 
property. 
The defendants did not prove any prescriptive right-of-
way, nor any other easement which could be acquired by 
prescription. The law does not recognize a general "wandering 
easement" to roam over the lands of another. The court advised 
counsel that if the Morgans sought to show an easement in 
gross he would rule that such an easement could not be acquired 
by prescription. The idea that some possible encroachment 
onto the land of another by playing baseball or pitching 
horseshoes, or roaming through the brush, or gazing on the 
trees and birds and wild flowers, could ripen into a prescriptive 
easement is patently absurd. Appellants cite no cases which 
could possibly sustain their unique contentions. 
During the trial appellants asserted a claim of "exclusive 
use and possession'' of the property by virtue of their tres-
passes. They could not possibly establish any prescriptive 
easement for exclusive enjoyment under the law. They argue 
that the recreational uses in connection with the enjoyment 
of the summer homes were "appurtenant to and necessary for 
the enjoyment and use of th summer home." The cases they 
cite do not support, but refute their arguments. In the case of 
Ernest v. Allen, 55 Utah 272, 184 P. 287, cited by appellants, 
the grantor of a tract of land reserved "an equal right" with 
the grantee to use a tract of land for vehicles, etc. The question 
in that case was whether the reservation in the deed created 
an eastment appurtenant to a specific tract of land or consti-
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tuted an easement in gross, although the grantor admittedly 
owned other lands to which she needed access over the land 
in question. In Btrtolina v. Frates, 89 Utah 238, 57 P. 2d 346, 
this Court certainly did not announce any doctrine such as 
asserted by the Morgans. What this Court said was that 
"Where a person claims to have acquired an easement by 
prescription over another's land, he must show that he has 
acquired it by his own continuous, open, uninterrupted, and 
adverse use under claim of right for the 20-year prescriptive 
period," and that the use must not be "by license or favor." 
In 1 Thompson on Real Property, sec. 417, page 683, 
it is stated that "An exclusive right of possession cannot be 
established by prescription, but only a disqualified right for 
a particular purpose," citing rrTripp v. Bailey, 74 Utah 57, 
276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417. The text writer states at page 
690 of the same volume that where large areas of "privately 
owned land are open and unenclosed, owners generally do 
not object to persons passing over them for their convenience, 
and many such roads are made and used. Under such cir-
cumstances, a person so using such ways cannot acquire a 
permanent right unless his intention to do so be known by 
the owner or so plainly apparent from the acts that knowledge 
should be imputed to the owner. Thus sporadic passage over 
land for the purpose of temporary convenience or for emer-
gency use is insufficient to create a way of prescription." 
(Italics added.) 
In Deseret Livestock Co. v. Sharp, ________ (Utah) ________ , 259 
P. 2d 607 at 610-611, the defendant claimed a right to use 
an area 2000 feet in width across plaintiff's land for "trailing 
sheep,'' although in the trailing operations all of the forage 
would be eaten by the sheep. This Court said: 
" ... In the instant case we have a situation where 
the plaintiff's land is of little value except for the graz-
ing of livestock and if we deprive plaintiff of this 
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benefit, it is left with an empty fee interest, requiring 
the payment of taxes but no commensurate value ... 
* * * * 
"The courts have announced a contigous rule when 
dealing with an easement, saying that it must be a 
right to use the land of another for a special purpose, 
not inconsistent with the general property in the land-
owner. Nielson v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d 
696; Etz v. Mamerow, 72 Ariz. 228, 233 P. 2d 442 ... " 
In Etz v. Mamerow, 72 Arizona 228, P. 2d 442 at 444, 
the court said: 
"An allegation of exclusive possession is wholly in-
consistent with the theory of establishing an easement. 
The right to possess, to use and to enjoy land upon 
which an easement is claimed remains in the owner 
of the fee except in so far as the exrcise of such right 
is inconsistent with the purpose and character of the 
easement. Pinkerton v. Pritchard, 71 Ariz. 117, 223 
P. 2d 933; Lanzago v. San Joaquin Light & Power 
Corp., 32 Cal. App. 2d 678, 90 P. 2d 825. An easement 
is a right which one person has to use the land of 
another for a special purpose. Callahan v. Walters, 
Tex. Civ. App. 190 S. W. 829. It is the right to use the 
land of another for a special purpose not inconsistent 
with a general property in the owner. It is distinguished 
from the occupation and enjoyment of the land itself." 
The defendants Morgan argued in the opposition to all 
of the recognized authorities on the subject in asking for a 
prescriptive easement for "exclusive use and enjoyment of the 
property." Appellants attempted to transform their willful 
trespasses during the past few years into an "easement of 
exclusive enjoyment," which is entirely alien to the law. The 
Morgans are quite willing for the plaintiffs to continue to pay 
the taxes. 
On page 20 the Morgans admit that "All of the property 
was formerly owned by Alvaro A. Pratt," which is quite a 
concession after arguing some pages previously that the Pratts 
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did not own all of it. However, without a shred of evidence 
to support their claims they assert that the Pratt title was 
subject to "easements." The Pratt title was not subject to 
any easements. Appellants then say that the court should have 
"granted an easement by prescription upon these properties 
for the uses covered by the proffer of proof." Neither the 
testimony nor the "proffer of proof" showed the creation of 
any easements. Appellants tried to create some nebulous 
''easement'' after their own engineers shattered their unfounded 
claims of title. It is elementary that if a person asserts a 
right-of-way by prescription, for example, he has to show just 
where it is located. It must be definitely located and definite 
in dimensions. The Morgans did not know just where the 
boundaries were situated nor where the cars were parked, 
except· that they admitted that it was marshy along the north 
line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood so that cars and vehicles 
could not park there. Having wandered from one unfounded 
theory to another, the appellants having seized the property 
which they did not own, made the presumptuous claim that 
they had an easement of exclusive use, which is a total stranger 
to the law. Actual and punitive damages should be assessed 
against the Morgans for their unconscionable conduct. 
POINT 7. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS' 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST DAVID BURT 
AFFLECK AND WIFE. THE APPEAL IS OBVIOUSLY 
DESIGNED TO HARASS SAID RESPONDENTS AND 
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSESS DAMAGES AGAINST 
THE MORGANS FOR PROLONGING THE GROUND-
LESS LITIGATION AGAINST THIRD-PARTY DEFEND-
ANTS. 
Appellants forced the third party defendants to come into 
court on a groundless claim of "breach of warranty." The 
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Morgans falsely alleged that David Burt Affleck and wife 
had sold and conveyed to Grant Morgan by two warranty deeds, 
the land described in the complaint. The property described 
in the complaint lies entirely in Section 22. The properties 
conveyed to Grant Morgan in 1951 and 1952 are situated 
entirely in Section 15. The land described in Exhibit 15-D does 
not even adjoin onto the land of plaintiffs. The deed descrip-
tions are tied to the northwest corner of Section 15. There 
was not the slightest excuse for trying to stretch the deed 
descriptions to cover any part of the land owned by plaintiffs. 
Accusations against David Burt Affleck of "willful and 
malicious breach of warranty, if he did not so inform Grant 
Morgan at the time of the purchase," are inexcusable and in 
defiance of the law and the facts. Grant Morgan admitted 
that he never had any discussion with David Burt Affleck 
about boundaries. The record shows that Grant Morgan was 
on notice that there was land between the north line of Lots 
1 and 2 of Merrywood and the David Burt Affleck property 
which neither Grant Morgan nor David Burt Affleck owned. 
Morgan did not tell Affleck he wanted to buy. There was no 
agreement except the deeds themselves for the sale of any 
property. Morgan's own broker prepared the deeds. Neither 
deed mentions any house nor any other fixtures. 
The Morgans have tried to alter the express language of 
those deeds by reading into those deeds a description of land 
which the grantors never owned and which they never agreed 
to sell. The argument on page 21 that both parties "intended" 
to sell and to buy "down to the fence lines" is untrue, but 
even if true would be immaterial, since a deed cannot be 
varied by parol. Neither David Burt Affleck nor Grant Morgan 
ever paid any taxes on the land described in the complaint. 
David Burt Affleck offered to sell his property for $7,500. 
Grant Morgan knew that there was a serious question as to 
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Lvw far south the Affleck land extended, and being a shrewd 
business man in the auto finance business, he made a counter 
offer of only $4,500, or 9/15th of Affleck's valuation. Morgan 
did not contract to buy anything more than David Burt Affleck 
then owned. The deeds did not convey any house nor any 
other improvements except the portions situated on the land 
described in the deeds. 
There was no conceivable breach of warranty. There 
has not been a failure of title in any particular as to any land 
described in the deeds or any improvements within the 
boundaries of those deeds. The argument that the trial court 
"divested Mr. Morgan of over one-half of his home, plus 
all of the land and improvements lying South of the resurveyed 
line and North of Lot 1, Merrywood Subdivision," is contrar} 
to the record. Grant Morgan never was invested with any titl( 
to any land or improvements outside the boundaries of the 
descriptions of land in the deeds from David Burt Affleck. 
Consequently, Morgan was never divested of any title, and 
the contention that he was divested of title is plain fiction. 
Furthermore, although Morgan only bought half of the house 
the court, by granting easements, actually awarded the use 
of all of it to him, but failed to require the defendants to 
remove it from the land of plaintiffs. 
In the case of Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 
460, the plaintiff sued for breach of warranty. Included in 
the warranty deed was a small tract of land which the de-
fendant did not own. Defendant alleged that plaintiff knew 
the boundaries of the land defendant owned and also that 
defendant did not intend to sell any land except the land 
which defendant owned. This Court held that what either 
of the parties might have intended contrary to the recitals 
in the deed was immaterial, and that the deed description 
could not be altered by parol evidence: 
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"As every lawyer well knows, the law is well settled 
that deeds, like all other written instruments, may not 
be contradicted, varied, or added to by parol. While 
that is not precisely what was attempted in this case, 
in the form stated, yet limiting plaintiff's rights to the 
boundary lines as they appear upon the land is in legal 
effect the same as though the defendant had been per-
mitted to vary the terms of the written description of 
the land conveyed by him and to withdraw the small 
area in dispute from the effect of his covenants of 
warranty and for quiet enjoyment. The foregoing cove-
nants are inserted in deeds of conveyance for the pro-
tection of the purchaser as against any defect of title 
and he has a right to rely on the deed as written as 
against outward appearances or even as against verbal 
statements to the contrary . . . " 
The case at bar is the converse of Van Cott v. Jacklin 
David Burt Affleck made no representations whatsoever to 
anyone. In fact, Morgan had no discussion with him personally. 
The lands described in the two deeds, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D, 
do not cover any of the land described in the complaint. There 
has been no failure of title to any land described in the two 
deeds. Grant Morgan has not been dispossessed. On the 
contrary, the Morgans have dispossessed the plaintiffs of their 
land. The Morgans not only took possession of all of the 
land conveyed by them, but in addition thereto they have seized 
possession of plaintiffs' land with knowledge that they did 
not pay for it nor complete an agreement to purchase any 
part of it although in 1950 Grant Morgan negotiated to 
purchase from plaintiffe' predecessor part of the land now 
owned by plaintiffs. 
There is no merit to the argument that the grantors 
"intended to pass title" to that portion of the house which 
was not on the land conveyed. Parol evidence is inadmissible 
to contradict the express language of the deeds. As stated in 
6 Thompson on Real Property, page 439, sec. 3270: 
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"Regardless of the parties' intent, a deed passes title 
to no property other than that which it describes. A 
deed cannot extend possession to lands not described 
therein, nor can a specific description be extended to 
include property not within its terms . . . " 
As stated in 6 Thompson on Real Property, sec. 3287, 
extrinsic evidence can not be resorted to in order to 
"contradict the deed, or make a description of other 
land than that described in the deed. It cannot be used 
to make the deed convey land not embraced in the 
words used to describe the subject-matter of the deed, 
but only to ascertain the intention of the parties as 
expressed by such words." 
There was no dispute as to the fact that "stake #31" and 
"stake #32" mentioned in the deed refer to points on the 
Old Arm Chair plat (Exhibit 5-P). The exact location of those 
stakes was described with reference to the northwest corner 
of Section 15. 
The case of Van Cott v. Jacklin, supra, ( (226 P. 460), 
refers to the well-established rule that covenants of warranty 
extend only to the lands described in the deed. As explained 
in 7 Thompson on Real Property, page 217: 
"The covenant of warranty is intended as an assur-
ance or guarantee of title; it does not enlarge or curtail 
the estate granted in the premises of a deed but guaran-
tees such estate as may be granted ... " 
On page 218 of the same volume it is stated: 
rrcovenant of warranty limited to estate and land 
conveyed.-The covenant of warranty applies to the 
estate conveyed, and can not enlarge that estate. If the 
deed conveys merely the grantor's interest in the land, 
a covenant of general warranty in it is limited and 
restricted to such interest, and does not warrant the 
land against a superior title in another. 
"It is limited as well to the particular parcel of 
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ground intended to be conveyed according to the de-
scription in the deed."· 
The intent of the parties must be ascertained from the 
express language of the deed. The two deeds from David 
Burt Affleck to Grant Morgan were prepared by the agent 
of Grant Morgan. They are limited to the land to which 
David Burt Affleck had record title. Obviously, the grantors 
did not intend to convey nor to warrant title to more land 
than they owned. The south boundary of the deed description 
in Exhibit 14-D runs through the middle of the house because 
the house was built across the boundary line. David Burt 
Affleck could not by parol evidence be proved to have some 
intention to sell land which he did not own. He did not own 
land south of the south line of Section 15. His intention is 
legally expressed in the deed. Except for the language "to 
the south line of Section 15," the deed description would be 
about 20 feet short of reaching the south line of Section 15. 
Defendants had a competent survey in 195 7 which followed 
the deed d.escriptions, ·and which survey clearly showed that 
the Morgans never acquired any title to the land described 
in the complaint, and also that the Morgans had no cause 
of action against their grantors for breach of any covenant of 
warranty. 
The deeds did not warrant that there was a house or 
other fixtures on the lands conveyed. The covenants of 
warranty could only relate to the land described in the deed, 
not to fixtures and improvements on adjoining property not 
described in the deed. With full knowledge of what was dis-
closed by the 1957 survey, the defendants Morgan prevailed 
upon the district court to order David Burt Affleck and wife 
brought into this litigation as third-party defendants by falsely 
alleging that said third party defendants had deeded to Grant 
Morgan the land owned by the plaintiffs. The Morgans had 
a survey plat (Exhibit 64-D) which clearly shows that one 
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deed Exhibit 14-D did not extend south of the south line of 
Section 15 and that the other deed Exhibit 15-D does not by 
any possible construction extend down to the south line of 
Section 15. Dragging the third party defendants into the case 
could only create confusion, annoyance and expense. 
Months after the suit was filed, in the fall of 1959, with 
full knowledge of the fact that the deed descriptions did not 
follow any fence lines, the Morgans had an abortive "fence 
line survey," which utterly disregarded the deed descriptions 
and which contradicted their own valid 1957 survey which 
followed the deed descriptions. Furthermore, that "fence line 
survey" showed a section of fence which did not exist in 1957 
or 1958, or at any time prior to September 1959. Such "fence 
line survey'' was not tied to a government corner, but to a 
nonexistent fictitious corner not mentioned in the deeds. In 
an effort to disparge the title of plaintiffs, defendants Morgan 
attempted to assail and contradict the official United States 
surveys and the field notes pertaining thereto, in violation of 
every known rule. 
The defendants Morgan never had any cause of action 
against third party defendants. Their claims of $12,100! 
damages for "breach of warranty" are utterly fictitious. The 
appeal from the judgment dismissing the third party complaint 
with prejudice is designed for delay. The third party defendants 
therefore move that this Honorable Court assess damages 
against the Morgans for an unwarranted prosecution of such 
appeal. 
ON THE CROSS-APPEAL OF PLAINTIFFS 
POINT 8. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT WARRANT THE GRANT-
ING OF ANY EASEMENT TO GRANT MORGAN AND 
EVA MORGAN; AND THE PORTIONS OF THE JUDG-
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MENT AND DECREE QUOTED IN THE CROSS-APPEAL 
SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM THE JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE. THE ABSENCE OF DAVID BURT AFFLECK 
FROM THE STATE OF UTAH FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR 
YEARS CO:N"STITUTED A BREAK IN THE PRESCRIP-
TIVE PERIOD, ALTHOUGH HIS ABSENCE WAS DUE 
TO MILITARY SERVICE. 
The plaintiffs and respondents, Gordon Burt Affleck and 
JOSEPHINE F. AFFLECK, his wife, have cross-appealed from 
those portions of the judgment and decree (all of paragraph 
9 and specified portions of paragraph 8, 12, 13 and 14) which 
grant to the Morgans an easement on the land of plaintiffs 
over the exact area on which the house encroaches and ease-
ments for continued use of the pumphouse and pipeline. (R. 
132-133). What the court did in effect was to grant to the 
Morgans an exclusive rental-free lease of the entire house 
and exclusive rental-free lease of the pumphouse and pipeline 
for the period of time in which those fixtures remain in exist-
ence, although the Morgans never purchased nor otherwise 
acquired title to anything within the boundaries of plaintiffs' 
land. 
If the court wanted to allow the Morgans to have the 
use of those fixtures which extend over onto plaintiffs' land, it 
should have required the Morgans to remove the house, pump-
house and pipeline from plaintiffs' lanc}1within a reasonable 
time. The house is on stilts as shown by the photographs 
in evidence, and it can be moved. It was error to grant the 
Morgans easements which amount to rent-free leases when 
they have never acquired any title thereto by the deeds executed 
by David Burt Affleck and wife, or from anyone else. 
As indicated in Alford v. Rodgers, 242 Ala 370, 6 So. 2d 
409, a person acquires title only to the boundary line in his 
deed and he does not acquire title to land beyond it as an 
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"appurtenance." Furthermore, as indicated in Olsen v. Noble, 
207 Ga. 899, 76 S. E. 775, 780, in order for an alleged easement 
to be appurtenant it must already be in existence; it cannot 
be an inchoate prescriptive claim over the land of another. 
If a person seeks to convey an inchoate prescriptive claim 
which has not yet ripened into an easement, such claim must 
be specifically described in the deed. (a) There was no 20-
year period of use which could have established an easement, 
even if the use had been of the character which could have 
created an easement by 20 years' use. Bertolina v. Frates, supra, 
(89 Utah 238, 57 P. 2d 346), holds that the use must not 
only be a claim of right, but must be "continuous, open, un-
interrupted, and adverse" for the entire 20-year prescriptive 
period. David Burt Affleck did not know where his boundaries 
were situated. Furthermore, there was an interruption in the 
use in 1941 after only 6 years' use. He was absent from the 
property for nearly 4 years while in military service. . The 
Solders' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A. 
Appendix, sees. 525 et seq., did not specify that prescriptive 
use should be deemed to run in favor of the service man 
while he was absent in military service. If such a provision 
had been incorporated into the statute it would likely have 
unconstitutional. Assuming that prescription would begin to 
run again after return from military service, there was no 
period of 20 years. Even if the period prior to the military 
service were added to the period subsequent to military service, 
(which would not be permissible) there would be less than a 
period of 20 years. The law requires the prescriptive use to 
be continuous for 20 years, and there was no period of 20 
years. 
(b) The encroachment of the house over onto the land of 
plaintiffs' could never ripen into an "easement for exclusive 
use and enjoyment" advocated by appellants. As aptly stated 
in 1 Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 417, page 682: ••An 
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interest in the land of another, greater than an incorporeal 
hereditament, such as the possession and use of a building 
thereon, cannot be established by prescription." At page 68:> 
the text writer states, "an exclusive right of possession cannot 
be established by prescription," citing Tripp v. Bagley, 74 
Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417. Neither the Morgans 
nor David Burt Affleck paid any taxes on the land in question, 
so that title by adverse possession could not be acquired. 
(c) The pipeline and pumphouse installed in 1935 were 
substantially concealed below the surface, so that prescription 
could not begin to run until notice, and no notice of any claim 
was ever given. Independent of that fact, no easement for 
conducting water could be acquired over the land of another 
without having a vested right. The evidence is conclusive 
that David Burt Affleck never acquired a water right under 
the laws of the State of Utah. He never filed an application 
with the State Engineer, and he did not acquire a water right 
from someone who owned one. (R. 486). As indicated in 
Neilson v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d 696, where a 
claimant asserts a prescriptive right-of-way for water he must 
first show that he acquired a vested and accrued water right. 
Since he did not file any application to appropriate, it was 
impossible to acquire a water right by adverse use when the 
use was not initiated until 1935. There is no proof that Grant 
Morgan ever acquired any water right for such property. The 
prescriptive period could not begin to run for a pipeline right-
of-way until a water right were acquired. 
No easements could have been acquired by prescription. 
nevertheless, the trial court by those portions of its decree 
excepted to on the cross-appeal, in effect gave the Morgans 
an "easement for exclusive use" of the portion of the house 
and the pumphouse and pipeline situated within the boundaries 
of plaintiffs' land. In effect the court fastened on plaintiffs 
without their consent and withouf' consideration a rent-free 
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lease in favor of the Morgans which practically takes the 
heart out of plaintiffs' land and greatly restricts the use of 
plaintiffs' land for an indefinite period. It is inequitable to 
allow the Morgans the use of those fixtures which encroach 
without requiring them to remove the same from plaintiffs' 
land within a reasonable period of time. 
CONCLUSION 
Every finding of fact which is adverse to the Morgans 
1s amply supported by competent evidence. Every provision 
of the decree which is adverse to them should be affirmed. 
The only error of the trial court was in granting the Morgans 
easements over the area where the house encroaches and for 
pipeline and pumphouse for the period in which those fixtures 
shall exist. The court in effect granted rent-free leases to the 
Morgans, and placed burdens on the land of the plaintiffs for 
which they did not bargain, and which were not established 
according to law. If the Morgans are to be granted the exclu-
sive use of those fixtures which encroach on plaintiffs' land, 
it should be on condition that they remove the same from 
plaintiffs' land within a reasonable period of time. 
The court proper! y reserved the question of damages 
caused by the trespasses by the Morgans. Damages should be 
assessed against the Morgans for maintaining the appeal 
against David Burt Affleck and wife, and thereby prolonging 
the groundless litigation against third-party defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY and BURTON 
MACOY A. McMURRAY 
Attorneys fo1' Plaintiffs, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants 
PAUL E. REIMANN 
Atto1'ney for Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents 
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